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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Modeling Economic Resilience and Animal Disease Outbreaks in the Texas High Plains. 
(December 2010)   
Hen-I Lin, B.A., National Taiwan University;  
M.S., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Bruce A. McCarl 
 
Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) could have a significant impact on the U.S. 
agriculture industry and the welfare of U.S. producers and U.S. consumers. In order to 
address the potential impact from animal disease outbreaks, this project is designed to 
utilize a combined epidemic and economic modeling framework to evaluate animal 
disease management strategies which can be used to reduce the potential losses in an 
unusual event such as FMD outbreaks. 
In this study, we compare the welfare changes among three different parties with 
different strategies using, 1) ANOVA analysis; 2) cost benefit analysis; and 3) Risk 
Aversion Coefficient (RAC) analysis. Four types of index feedlots are selected in the 
study including, Feedlot Type 1 (> 50,000 heads of animals), Feedlot Type 4 
(backgrounder feedlot), Large Beef Grazing (>100 heads of animals), and Backyard 
(<10 heads of animals). Results suggest that early detection of FMD events has the 
advantage in reducing risk as shown in the epidemiological impacts. Enhanced 
surveillance is found to be a preferred mitigation strategy for U.S. consumers in the 
iv 
scenario of smaller feedlot disease introductions (e.g. Large Beef Grazing and Backyard) 
and for U.S. producers in the larger feedlot disease introduction scenarios (e.g. Feedlot 
Type 1 and Feedlot Type 4). Adequate vaccination is not cost effective when seeking to 
minimize average loss but becomes a preferred strategy when the risk aversion rises. 
Risk modeling with stochastic programming adopted in this study also confirms 
the importance of incorporating risk evaluation into decision making process. It offers 
another option for us to evaluate the mitigation strategies. Two portfolio models are 
adopted in this study including, E-V model (mean variance portfolio choice model) and 
Unified model. The results show that the preference for control strategies depends on 
risk attitude. Early detection proves to be preferable for U.S. consumers and is also 
preferred by U.S. processors and producers as Risk Aversion Parameters (RAP) rises. 
Adequate vaccination strategy can benefit U.S. consumers but does not give U.S. 
processors a better outcome. Adequate vaccination provides a better choice for U.S. 
producers when the RAP rises. Enhanced surveillance is preferred for U.S. consumers. 
For U.S. processors, enhanced surveillance does not give a better risk/return outcome. 
U.S. producers are likely to switch their preferences from regular surveillance to 
enhanced surveillance as their RAP rises.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Stimulated by economic growth, the demand for livestock products has been 
growing rapidly. According to a 2009 United Nations, Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) report, the consumption of livestock products has shown substantial 
growth in major developing and developed countries, excepting in Africa (United 
Nations 2009). Research finds that the consumption of livestock products is significantly 
influenced by income level and urbanization (Rae 1998). More advanced technology 
used in breeding, feeding, processing, transporting, and marketing of livestock products 
has resulted in structural change in agriculture. The change in both consumption and 
livestock production has increased the volume of international trade. The United Nations 
FAO report also shows an increase in international trade volume and share of total 
agricultural livestock production from 1980 to 2006 (United Nations 2009).   
Because of technology use and increased livestock production, agricultural 
production has also gradually become more greatly geographically clustered (United 
Nations 2009).  
Considering the concentration of animals and urbanization, plus the more recent 
greater incidence of disease outbreaks, the prevention and control of potential animal 
disease outbreaks has become a very critical issue. For example, in the United States the 
cattle industry is very highly concentrated in the Great Plains region (see Figure 1). 
Several disease outbreak events have shown that naturally occurring animal disease can 
cause not only extreme economic loss in the livestock industry in this country, but can  
*This dissertation follows the style of The American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 
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also be a potential threat to human health and security of the general public as discussed  
below.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: U.S. cattle and calves distribution  
Source: US Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Census Statistics 
Service, 2007. Cattles and Calve Inventory-2007.   
 
In February 19, 2001, Donald Vidgeon, a British livestock transporter, noted a 
problem with sows he was to transport that morning, and alerted Mr. Craig Kirby, a 
resident veterinarian in Brentwood, United Kingdom (UK). This started the discovery of 
a Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) outbreak in 2001, which was soon determined as the 
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worst recorded epidemic outbreak (Anderson, 2002). Although FMD is not a direct 
danger to human health, this outbreak resulted in an extreme loss to the country. During 
the epidemic FMD outbreak in the UK, over 6 million animals were slaughtered and 
approximately £8 billion were lost (Donaldson et al. 2006).   
FMD has traditionally been controlled by conventional strategies, including the 
slaughter of infected animals and the „stamping-out‟ strategy (Anderson, 2002). 
Researchers also indicate that the non-vaccination policy was adopted in Europe from 
1992 and the strategy of stamping-out was used under farmers‟ or producers‟ choices 
(Cohen, Van Asseldonk, and Stassen, 2007). These strategies were used in the FMD 
outbreak occurring in 1981 at the Isles of Wight, United Kingdom, and they were 
actually effective in preventing the disease from spreading in the regions where a small 
number of cases were found (Anderson, 2002).   
However, conventional strategies were not able to stop the 2001 UK epidemic of 
FMD disease outbreak in most parts of the country (UK). Therefore, a culling strategy 
was adopted as an alternative to control the outbreak (Anderson, 2002). All infected and 
direct contact healthy animals were removed to ensure the elimination of FMD. As the 
UK exported meat to other countries, the impact reached many other traditional trade 
partners. Ex post estimates show that the damage to the UK economy is huge and the 
total estimated cost is between £7.6 to £8.5 billion (Mangen and Burrell 2003). The 
incident then led to increased public awareness and policy consideration relating ways to 
deal with threats from infectious animal diseases.      
Recent bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), avian influenza (AI), and 
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classical swine flu events also raise similar concerns. In the United States, the 2003 BSE 
event resulted in immediate closure of beef overseas markets in several major U.S. beef 
importing countries, including Japan, Korea, Mexico, and Canada, stimulating lower 
prices and beef industry losses (Pendell et al. 2007).   
During the 1997 Hong Kong avian influenza outbreak event, the AI virus was 
discovered among poultry handlers (WHO 2007). This event has started establishing 
evidence that AI can infect both animals and humans. Beginning in 2003, AI viruses 
caused animal disease outbreaks in poultry in several countries in southeastern Asia, 
including Bangladesh, Thailand, India, Indonesia, and Myanmar (WHO 2007). At the 
same time, China, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam also reported infections (WHO 2007). 
Approximately 250 million birds either died or were culled during the outbreak. The 
economic loss in Asia was also sizeable (WHO 2007).  
The recent swine flu (influenza A H1N1) outbreak starting from Mexico in April 
2009 has been reported to cause more than 18,114 deaths and affect more than 214 
countries as of May 2010 (WHO 2010). The novel strand of influenza virus usually 
emerges from the exchange of viruses among different animals, humans, or wild birds 
(Narain, Kumar, and Bhatia 2009). Given that current agriculture production involving 
animals tend to be concentrated in populated areas because of the trend toward 
urbanization, the probability of having an epidemic infectious disease may be greater 
and will result in threats to potential economic loss and human health.         
Research has suggested that movement of animals is an important risk factor 
influencing epidemic spread (Green, Kiss, and Kao 2006). Therefore, implementing 
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effective prevention or response strategies at the local level to prevent the outbreak from 
happening has grown to be a critical issue in the area of animal disease control, 
particularly within the context of modern agricultural industry.   
Because FMD is the most contagious animal disease of hoofed mammals and a 
potential massive animal health and economic threat, FMD is a priority area of concern 
within the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS). Many studies on the analysis of FMD-related decision-
making have appeared mainly in veterinary journals (Bates et al. 2001, 2003; Berentsen, 
Dijkuizen, and Oskam 1992; Ferguson et al. 2001; Garner and Lack 1995; Keeling et al. 
2001; Schoenbaum and Disney 2003). Most of those studies examine decision-making 
once an outbreak has occurred, largely addressing post-outbreak disease spread 
management with vaccination and slaughter as FMD disease spread management 
policies.   
To further contribute to knowledge in this area, this dissertation is designed to 
research the effects of various mitigation strategies using combined Epidemic-Economic 
Simulation Modeling in an effort to provide information to reduce the cost and incidence 
of extreme disasters, and improve industry economic resiliency. This study is conducted 
in the face of a possible animal disease outbreak in the Texas High Plains.   
1.1. Research Questions 
FMD is a high risk disease facing the livestock industry. Research at the Center for 
Foreign Animal and Zoonotic Disease Defense (FAZD) has been examining the 
vulnerability of animal agriculture pertaining to this and other disease issues. In 
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addressing the FMD issue one can approach it from several perspectives. First, one may 
address the fundamental issues inherent in the following questions:   
1. How much of a threat is FMD? 
2. Are there actions that if undertaken would limit vulnerability in terms of disease 
management alternatives during the course of an outbreak? 
3. What are scientific developments that could accelerate detection or provide 
increased degrees of immunity?  
4. What actions will be undertaken afterwards that could reduce further disease 
damage from different viewpoints of different parties?  
Second, one could evaluate the risk consequences of mitigation actions by studying 
the welfare effects of various disease management strategies using stochastic modeling 
and economic risk-associated analytical approaches.  
In this work a combination of these approaches will be used employing combined 
economic-epidemic simulation analysis, and a further risk based investigation. 
1.2. Research Objectives and Methodology 
This dissertation research investigates the effect of mitigation strategies on sectors‟ 
resiliency to potential animal disease outbreak. Addressing this problem requires a 
modeling formulation that depicts the resiliency response to decisions and sector 
characteristics. Two major modeling approaches will be taken to address this problem. 
The first modeling approach is an economic-epidemic framework that evaluates the 
consequences of a set of disease management strategies, and examining their effects on 
welfare, welfare distribution in turn making inferences about effects on resiliency. 
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Disease outbreak will be simulated under a stochastic disease spread assumption. The 
second modeling approach involves determination of “optimal" resiliency responses 
with risk modeling through stochastic programming. 
1.3. Case Study Region 
Although the threat of animal disease outbreak on agricultural product supply in the 
United States is generally huge, Texas is one of the more vulnerable states. Texas has 
around 20 percent of the U.S. beef cattle production, and the total cattle industry sales 
value is estimated around $8 billion per year (Elbakidze et al. 2008). An FMD outbreak 
occurs in Texas, could well cause serious damage to the U.S. agricultural sector, and, 
consequently, to the whole economy. Therefore, Texas is an important region to target 
when researching resiliency responses of sector characteristics to animal disease 
outbreak.   
In Texas, the major area for where beef cattle feedlots are located is in the 
Panhandle region.  This study examines an 8-county area in the Panhandle of Texas (see 
Figure 2). According to the US Department of Agriculture (2007), those 8 counties 
contain 17.5 percent of the cattle and calves in the State of Texas, which is 2.5 percent of 
the U.S. total cattle and calf population. Moreover, in the category of cattle on feed, 
those regions contain 83.5 percent of Texas animals and 16.4 percent of U.S. animals. 
The initial motivation is to investigate a potential economic problem in modeling 
economic resilience for a possible animal disease outbreak in the Texas High Plains.   
In addition, examining mitigation options on a local basis rather than a national 
scale can provide a better understanding of various components of developed optimal 
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economic approaches used to prevent or detect disease outbreaks. Characteristics of 
developed economic models can be applied to a broader setting.   
 
 
Figure 2: The Texas high plains project study regions 
 
1.4. Organization of the Study 
This dissertation is organized into five sections. Section 1 provides the introduction, 
research methodology, case study focus and objectives of the study. Section 2 gives an 
overview of the literature on the history of biosecurity within the context of animal 
disease management, the development of FMD disease control strategies, and the 
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concept of economic resiliency, as well as its application in decision support tools. 
Section 3 applies an integrated epidemic-economic modeling to control strategies 
applied to an FMD disease outbreak in the Texas High Plains, and also employs 
stochastic dominance and risk aversion analysis to evaluate the effectiveness of 
mitigation strategies. Section 4 reports results of using a stochastic programming 
application of two risk portfolio choice formulations to evaluate optimal choice of 
mitigation strategies. Section 5 gives conclusions and discussion of future research. 
1.5. Definition of Key Terms 
Biosecurity: society‟s collective responsibility to safeguard the population from 
dangers presented by pathogenic microbes whether intentionally released or naturally 
occurring (Fidler and Gostin, 2008); it describes management practices preventing 
infectious disease from being introduced into a herd or flock. 
Economic Resiliency: the ability of an agency/sector to recover from a severe 
incident (Rose, 2004). It includes two types of resilience: 1) inherent – the ability to 
recover under normal circumstances (eg. The ability to substitute inputs or allocate 
resources to respond to the price increase followed by the incident); 2) adaptive – the 
ability to recover under crisis (eg. Expanding the possibilities for input substitutions or 
providing more information to match suppliers‟ or customers‟ needs.) (Rose, 2004) 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. History and Origins of Agricultural Biosecurity 
The history of agricultural resources considered to be potential targets of 
bioterrorism can be traced back to World War I (Monterey Institute of International 
Studies 2009). In 1925, the Geneva Protocol was initiated to prohibit chemical or 
biological weapons, since many countries such as Germany, Japan, and Russia (Former 
Soviet Union) used viruses to kill people or contaminate the food supply during the war 
(Geneva Protocol 1925; MIIS 2009). The concept of biosecurity emerged shortly 
thereafter and covers both deliberate and unintentional event origins. Whether the virus 
is released intentionally or occurs naturally, the threat to human health is clearly 
immense.   
As a result, biosecurity has developed into the concept that is defined as a critical 
responsibility of the nation, which is to protect its citizens from dangers presented by 
pathogenic microbes (Fidler and Gostin 2008). It encompasses issues related to the use 
of biological weapons and the naturally or accidentally occurring infected disease. A 
consensus on the importance of addressing challenges of naturally infected disease 
outbreak has surfaced among researchers, policymakers, and international society. In 
2006, the Bush Administration named fighting against naturally occurring disease 
epidemics as one of the prioritized national security topics (White House 2006), 
reflecting how massive the impact of a disease outbreak could be on the nation.   
Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) is one of the most highly infectious animal 
diseases. Although human health will not be impacted by FMD, it can cause significant 
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economic damage because of the high likelihood of infecting animals exposed to the 
virus (GAO 2009). The United States has been FMD free since 1929; however, the 
possibility of accidentally introducing FMD into the country through international 
agricultural trading is still there, considering the fact that FMD has continued to happen 
in many countries in the world (U.S. Department of Agriculture 2007). FMD spread and 
outbreak cases have occurred in Europe, Asia, South America, and Africa since 2005 
(see Figure 3).  
 Research has suggested that movement of animals is a large risk factor for many 
infectious diseases (Green et al. 2006). As a result, it is important to focus on the topic of 
risk management within the context of animal disease outbreak such as FMD in disease-
free regions to provide involved governmental bodies and industry greater knowledge 
for effectively carrying out the diseased-related decision-making process, while facing 
an unexpected outbreak.     
Therefore, this literature review will focus on various strategies used in FMD 
control management, and the relationship between selected strategy options and 
economic resiliency, and the development of epidemic economic simulation model 
selected to apply in this study. 
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Figure 3: Global map of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) outbreak since 2005  
Source: World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), Global map of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) 
outbreak since 2005, 2010. World Animal Health Information Database. (Accessed Aug 14, 2010) 
 
2.2. FMD Control Measures 
The “best” control measure to prevent an FMD epidemic from happening still 
remains controversial. Research conducted in the UK and Netherlands suggests that 
most stakeholders of the study prefer to adopt a preventive strategy to reduce risk of the 
outbreak, and then to eradicate the disease (Cohen, Van Asseldonk, and Stassen 2007). 
An effective early warning system to monitor animal health and vaccination can be used 
to prevent the outbreak from happening and/or reduce its magnitude. Control strategies 
introduced in this review include a) vaccination, b) slaughter control, and c) culling 
strategies.   
Vaccination has been used to control FMD effectively in three settings (1) as 
prophylactic protection prior to an outbreak, (2) as an action to limit spread during the 
outbreak, or (3) as a strategy combined with slaughter control (Kitching and Hutber 
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2003). Hutber et al. (2010) conduct a review of previous vaccination programs and 
divides all into three major categories based on where vaccinations are used. That 
includes vaccinations applied in areas where the disease is endemic, semi-endemic, or 
disease-free. Due to the cost and possible entry of animal disease from vaccine 
administration plus international trade concerns, disease-free regions are not likely to 
take control of measures of regular vaccinations (Hutber et al. 2010). Therefore, 
vaccinations can be used as an effective measure, combined with other strategies when 
an unexpected disease outbreak occurs. However, whether vaccinations or slaughter 
control are more effective in controlling an epidemic remains controversial.        
Ferguson et al. (2001) called for cost-benefit analysis of mass vaccination options 
versus slaughter-based control of infrequent outbreaks. Schoenbaum and Disney (2003) 
investigated the effectiveness of four slaughter and three vaccination strategies under 
varying conditions of herd sizes and rates of disease spread in the United States. Four 
slaughter options include slaughtering: a) only infected herds, b) herds with direct 
contact with infected herds, c) herds within 3km distance of infected herds, and d) herds 
with both direct and indirect contact with infected herds. Three vaccination options 
include: a) no vaccination, b) vaccination of all herds within 10km of infected herds after 
two infected cases were detected, and c) vaccination of all herds within 10km after 50 
were detected. Although they generally found that ring slaughter control based on herd 
demographics and the rate of contact among herds is the best option as opposed to other 
slaughter strategies. They also found that early ring vaccination helps to control the 
outbreak duration. The finding is also supported by Keeling et al. (2001). They suggest 
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that both ring slaughtering and ring vaccination were effective strategies if implemented 
rigorously, although ring slaughtering was more effective. A neighborhood cull option 
was found to be more effective than neighborhood vaccination. They also argue that 
spatial distribution, size, and species composition of farms all influence the pattern and 
regional variability of outbreaks.      
A recent review article argues that the effectiveness of vaccination and slaughter 
control also differ on the infection status of the location (Hutber et al. 2010). It further 
indicates that the benefits of ring and targeted vaccination is not greater than slaughter 
control in disease-free regions and indicates that it is unclear that emergent blanket 
vaccination has economic benefits over slaughter control. They also found that blanket 
vaccination proved to be an effective measure in disease-free and semi-endemic regions.  
Some other research investigates the relationship between the speed of slaughter 
control and FMD spread (Morris et al. 2001). They found that delaying the slaughter of 
animals at the infected farms beyond 24 hours would have slightly increased the size of 
the FMD epidemic during the UK 2001 FMD outbreak. Failure to carry out pre-emptive 
slaughter of animals at the susceptible farms would have substantially increased the size 
of the epidemic. Honhold et al. (2004) also suggest that there is a correlation between the 
speed of slaughter control and disease transmission among cattle with lower innate 
immunity. This research investigates the relationship among the rate of disease spread, 
average time from the first lesion to slaughter on infected premises, and the intensity of 
contagious and non-contagious premises. They found that the average time from the first 
lesion to slaughter control and the intensity of culling on non-contagious premises has a 
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significant relationship (Honhold, et al., 2004).      
Hutber et al. (2010) indicate that it takes approximately 5 days to achieve the 
immunity of vaccinated animals and finding the matched type of vaccines to the strain 
may also influence the effectiveness of this strategy. Morris et al. (2001) suggest that 
vaccination of up to three of the most outbreak dense areas, in addition to an adopted 
control policy, such as slaughter, would have slightly decreased the number of infected 
farms. However, relying solely on vaccination and disregarding other control policies 
would have significantly increased the size of an outbreak.   
Garner and Lack (1995) investigated the effectiveness of four control options for 
FMD, including a) “stamping out” of infected herds only, b) stamping out of infected 
and dangerous contact herds, c) stamping out of infected herds plus early ring 
vaccination, and d) stamping out of infected herds plus late ring vaccination. They found 
that if FMD is likely to spread rapidly then slaughter of dangerous contacts and infected 
herds would reduce the economic impact of the FMD outbreak. Early ring vaccination 
turned out to reduce the size and duration of an outbreak, but was uneconomic when 
compared to stamping-out alone. 
In general, slaughter control and vaccination are both more effective options among 
all control measures. Several studies suggest that slaughter control is an effective 
strategy; however, the combination of slaughter control and vaccination can help to 
reduce an epidemic in a more efficient way.    
2.3. Surveillance and Detection 
Surveillance programs developed at the local level provide protection from possible 
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animal disease spread. However, surveillance programs usually are more costly than 
detection as the investment in disease control and management itself is expensive. 
Research has indicated that the United States is under-investing in a surveillance 
program for FMD (Kompas, Che, and Ha, 2006). Early detection of an animal outbreak 
such as FMD usually will reduce production and tourism consequences, as well as 
disease management costs during and after the spread. However, less attention has been 
devoted to pre-event decision-making.  
Although some researchers have focused on surveillance system investigation, less 
attention has been devoted to pre-event decision-making. Attention to surveillance 
program (Bates et al. 2003; Akhtar and White 2003; Ekboir 1999), limited empirical 
investigation has addressed the issue of finding the optimal economic balance between 
pre-event preparedness and post-event response actions. Elbakidze and McCarl (2006) 
address this issue by investigating the economic balance between the pre-event 
installation/operation of surveillance and detection systems and post-event slaughter 
actions. They also examine the reliance within an optimal cost minimizing plan on pre-
event periodic animal health testing, versus sole reliance on post-event response 
measures. They found that there is a positive correlation between pre-event investment 
and the probability and severity of the potential event, as well as costs and effectiveness 
of response options. Specifically, theoretical and empirical investigations suggest that 
the optimal level of investment in pre-event preparedness is increased when disease 
spread rate gets larger; response strategy is less effective or more costly; the probability 
of disease introduction increases; the costs of the pre-event activity fall; and the co-
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benefits of the strategy outside of an event increase.   
Elbakidze et al. (2009) developed an integrated epidemiologic economic model to 
simulate the spread of disease across the region under various combinations of disease 
control options. The purpose of this integrated model is to estimate economic loss within 
the local cattle industry and associated costs of using corresponding disease management 
options based on the data obtained from epidemiologic output.  
They use the AusSpread model (Garner and Beckett 2005) as the epidemiological 
model to simulate disease spread in this study. AusSpread is a state transition model, 
which builds a geographic information system (GIS) framework into the model design. 
This model is modified to include stochastic elements to include probabilistic factors in 
simulating disease spread (Garner and Beckett 2005). The spread of the disease is based 
on a susceptible, latent, infectious, recovered state transition specification where herds 
fall into one of the four categories at any given time period (Garner and Beckett 2005). 
The probabilities of transition from susceptible to latent states depend on the rate of 
direct and indirect contacts between herds and the probability of infection given contact. 
Elbakidze et al.‟s (2009) simulations suggest that, on average, an epidemic might cost up 
to about $1 billion in local high-intensive cattle industry losses alone.  
Based on the assumptions and results of epidemiologic disease spread simulations, 
Elbakidze et al. (2009) found that generally early detection was the most economically 
effective control option of those considered in the study. The payoff for detecting an 
incursion earlier was substantial: in the case of an epidemic originating in a large feedlot, 
the cost saving on average was $150 million. Although the costs of early detection 
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programs were not modeled in this study, the findings suggested that, if an outbreak was 
to originate in a large feedlot, an early detection program, which would cost up to $150 
million, would likely pass the benefit cost test. Adequate vaccine availability and 
enhanced surveillance were not economically effective in minimizing overall costs of 
disease outbreak, compared to delayed vaccine availability and the default surveillance 
strategy, respectively.  
In addition, Elbakidze et al. (2009) used Generalized Stochastic Dominance 
methodology (McCarl 1990) to make inferences on the scenarios for which the 
cumulative distribution functions crossed. They found that for large feedlot introduction 
scenarios of all 16 considered mitigation strategies, the strategy of slaughter of infected, 
slaughter of dangerous contacts combined with regular surveillance and early detection 
was dominant if the risk aversion coefficient (RAC) is below 0.01 or above 0.099, while 
for RAC between those values the strategy of slaughtering infected and dangerous 
contact herds combined with early detection and enhanced surveillance was dominant. 
For backgrounder feedlot introduction scenarios, if RAC is lower than -0.099 then 
slaughtering infected and dangerous contact herds, combined with early detection and 
enhanced surveillance, is dominant. If RAC is greater than -0.099 then the strategy with 
slaughtering infected and dangerous contact herd, combined with early detection and 
regular surveillance, is dominant. For large grazing herd introduction scenarios, if RAC 
is below 0.13 then the dominant strategy is to slaughter infected and dangerous contact 
herds combined with regular surveillance and early detection. Otherwise dominant 
strategy is slaughter of infected and dangerous contact herds combined with early 
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detection and enhanced surveillance. For backyard herd introduction scenarios the 
strategy of slaughtering infected and dangerous contact herds, combined with enhanced 
surveillance and early detection, is dominant at all values of RAC. 
It does not look so certain that early detection will pass the cost benefit test in the 
results of the epidemiologic model; even the costs of early detection programs was not 
considered in the modeling. All the numbers and estimates in the study of Elbakidze et al. 
(2009) are reported as an average value, which might neglect the severity of infrequent 
outbreak. However, in most catastrophic outbreak cases, the related impact to the 
industry and the society can be significantly large so that a prevention measure may be 
necessary. 
Due to limited research targeted on this area, this dissertation study will extend 
knowledge relative to finding the optimal mitigation strategy of improving economic 
resiliency in the face of a potential FMD outbreak. The details of the development of 
integrated epidemic/economic model will be described in the next section. 
2.4. The Development of Integrated Epidemic/Economic Simulation Model 
For the purpose of evaluating alternative control practices, a linked 
economic/epidemic model will be used.  
Two major components are included in such a model: epidemic simulation and 
economic simulation. In an epidemic simulation, the focus is on simulating the disease 
spread under various control strategies and introduction scenarios. This means the 
epidemic model simulates the disease spread from multiple time periods, from the period 
of disease introduction, of restocking and recovering trade relationships to the time 
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period of the full recovery from the outbreak. The result will be output distributions on 
disease spread characteristics under the control strategy used and the disease 
introduction characteristics. The economic model then uses output from the 
epidemiologic model to simulate the economic cost when facing a potential FMD 
outbreak. The key economic model output will be the economic loss incurred by 
producers within the cattle industry, and the government-borne costs of implementing 
disease control strategies.  
The utilization of this integrated epidemic/economic model is divided into four 
phases: a) develop scenarios; b) epidemic simulation; c) economic simulation; and d) 
Analysis/Feedback Loop. A comprehensive research process procedure will be presented 
in Figure 4 below:  
 
 
Figure 4: Comprehensive integrated economic/epidemic modeling procedure 
Develop Scenarios 
• Based on Data Collected from Survey
• Episodic or Epidemic/Geographically    
Representation Assumption
Epidemic Simulation 
• Produce Epidemic Output
• Convert Epidemic Output to Economic Input
Economic Simulation
• Produce Economic Output
Analysis/Feedback Loop 
• Results Reporting
• Feedback Loop to Adjust Control Strategies
   
21 
2.4.1. Develop Scenarios 
In terms of developing scenarios, there are several factors to be considered.  The 
first is to determine the type of disease spread. The disease spread can be either episodic 
or epidemic. The second factor is where the disease spread occurs, which will be the 
geographic spread assumption. The third factor will be what control strategies to use and 
how they will be implemented. The last factor to be taken into account will be the 
assumption related to the potential impact on the international trade market.  
2.4.2. Epidemic Models 
Before building an integrated model, it is important to choose what control 
measures will be adopted during the simulation. In general, herd demographics and 
contact rates among herds in the region to be simulated should be collected beforehand.  
Epidemic modeling includes two different types of simulation: episodic modeling, which 
is to simulate until the disease is eradicated totally, and endemic modeling, which is to 
have disease spread reach a stable state. Two essential ways to model epidemics include 
spatial and non-spatially based approaches. Spatial modeling will be used to collect data 
on actual locations of infected herds and contact rates among them to simulate the 
disease spread. Non-spatially based models will use algorithms for disease spread to 
estimate the cost of a disease spread. For capturing the full distribution of disease spread 
accurately, a spatial stochastic model will be used in this study (Hagerman, 2009). 
In the epidemic model, the investigation usually will target on the state of the 
animal health, which follows the Texas High Plains Report (Elbakidze et al. 2008), and 
generally includes four states: susceptible, latent, infectious, and recovered/removed. 
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Susceptible state refers to herds that could be susceptible to the disease. Latent state 
usually implies that animals have contracted the disease, but have not shown any clinical 
signs yet. When the clinical signs of infection are apparent, animals are at the infectious 
state. At this stage, the disease is being diagnosed and the treatment or response 
strategies are being taken. Recovered state usually refers to animals that either develop 
antibodies during the disease outbreak or are immune to the disease. Removed state 
implies that animals may have died because of the disease or other taken control 
measures such as slaughter control. Therefore, the disease spread is simulated based on 
whether a herd falls into one of these four states at any given time period.  The 
probabilities of changing from susceptible to latent state rely on the rate of direct and 
indirect contacts among herds and the probability of infection given contact (Elbakidze 
et al. 2009).  
2.4.3. AusSpread Model     
In this study, the epidemic model employed will be the AusSpread model (Gardner 
and Beckett 2005), which is a stochastic, state transition susceptible-latent-infected-
recovered (SLIR) model operating within the GIS framework. This model is appropriate 
for modeling activities in this integrated model. The AusSpread model also operates at 
different scales including the farm level, regional level, and national level (Gardner and 
Beckett 2005). Region usually refers to an area that is delimited by natural or 
geopolitical boundaries, and where homogenous animal production industry is located 
(Gardner and Beckett 2005). Considering characteristics of the Texas High Plains 
Region, the AusSpread model is an appropriate model to select in simulating a potential 
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disease spread at the region scale.     
AusSpread simulates disease spread on a daily basis. Therefore, contacts among 
different animal species are considered in the modeling process. Animal movements are 
included as well. Although the simulation is limited within a certain region, animal 
movements out of that region are recorded and tracked. The AusSpread model uses 
spatial distributions of livestock species including: feedlots, dairies, large and small beef 
operations, swine, small ruminants (sheep and goats), and backyard herds and their 
predicted contact structure to simulate the spread of FMD within the region.      
There are three options available in the AusSpread model for modeling the 
predicted spread of disease: a spread rate parameter, which is analogous to the basic 
reproductive ratio (Ro), direct and indirect contact pathways, and a mixed (Ro and 
pathways) approach. The current version of AusSpread uses direct and indirect contact 
pathways to model disease spread. In addition to modeling contacts between herds, the 
model also incorporates disease spread due to sale barns, order buyers, and windborne 
spread from large feedlots and swine facilities. 
In this study, a version of this model was used that was adapted to fit characteristics 
of Texas High Plains Cattle Industry (Ward, Highfield, and Garner, 2007; Ward et al., 
2009; Elbakidze et al., 2009; Hagerman, 2009). Detection, vaccination, and surveillance 
strategies were simulated for the purposes of this study. The effectiveness of early 
detection versus late detection, adequate availability of vaccination versus limited 
availability of vaccination, and enhanced surveillance versus regular surveillance will be 
compared.    
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2.4.4. Economic Modeling 
The economic model will use the outcome obtained from simulating a FMD spread 
using the epidemic model to calculate the associated economic impact of the potential 
outbreak. The impact calculated will include lost gross value of animals, lost gross 
income due to temporary business inactivity, consumer loss, trade loss, and cost of 
implementing mitigation strategies (Elbakidze et al. 2009). Therefore, the economic 
model needs to reflect the model generated disease spread and control characteristics. 
Four types of economic models could be used: simple cost calculating cost benefit 
analysis, input-output analysis, partial equilibrium, and computable general equilibrium 
models.  
As this study intends to evaluate local region impact, cost of utilizing a certain 
control strategy, consumer losses, trade losses, and the general economic impact of the 
disease outbreak, the model equipped with great flexibility is appropriate for this type of 
examination. The Agricultural Sector Model (ASM) of the Forestry and Agricultural 
Sector Optimization Model (FASOM) is the model that is capable of examining all items 
we intend to evaluate. Therefore, this model is chosen for this study.   
2.4.5. FASOM    
The Agricultural Sector Model (ASM), which is part of the Forestry and 
Agricultural Sector Optimization Model (FASOM), was described in studies (Adams et 
al. 1993; McCarl 1990) and has a long history. The driving force of creating FASOM is 
to model intertemporal optimizing behavior of the economic agents that would be 
affected by carbon sequestration policies. Private timberland owners‟ decisions usually 
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are influenced by tree farmers who plant millions of acres of potentially harvestable 
timber. By linking forest and agricultural sector in a dynamic framework, producers in 
both sectors can predict the consequences of their decisions and the impact of tree 
planting policies. This newly created model in a dynamic framework also allows for the 
land price equilibration in the sectors and for the transfer of lands based on the land‟s 
marginal profitability in all alternative forest and agricultural lands. 
Therefore, FASOM is a mathematical programming model which is characterized 
by dynamic, nonlinear, and price-endogenous features (Adams et al. 1996). The model 
can simulate the multimarket, multi-period equilibrium for each product market. The 
need for maximizing the sum of producers‟ and consumers‟ surpluses in the market is 
also satisfied. Product prices in the two sectors are simulated in the model as well. In 
general, FASOM uses an optimizing technique to simulate the economic markets, which 
characterize transformation of resources into products over time, initial and terminal 
conditions, availability of fixed resources, and policy constraints (Adam et al. 1996), 
presenting the estimates of total social welfare in the form of consumer‟s and producer‟s 
surpluses. Due to the fact that this model is equipped with these characteristics, it is a 
good mathematical programming tool to utilize in this study, while the purpose is to 
evaluate the economic impact of a potential animal outbreak considering the welfare of 
producer‟s surplus and consumer‟s surplus. 
2.4.6. Agricultural Sector Model (ASM)  
The Agricultural Sector Model (ASM) is a subcomponent of FASOM (Chang et al. 
1992; Adam et al. 1996) and is the particular part of FASOM that will be used herein. 
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ASM is a price-endogenous model designed to be simulated in the agricultural sector. It 
simulates 36 primary crop and livestock commodities and 39 secondary or processed 
commodities. There are more than 2,000 production possibilities (budgets) included in 
the model. Budgets for beef, dairy, hogs, sheep, broilers, turkeys, egg layers, and horses 
are included in this model, although the last category is treated in a very cursory fashion. 
Within the beef and hog operations, a number of intermediate budgets are represented to 
separate out important stages of production. The four budgets impacted by FMD, beef, 
dairy, hogs, and sheep, are discussed in detail below (Adams et al. 2005): 
 Beef: Fed and non-fed beef are generated with intermediate goods of  heifer and 
steer calves, heifer and steer yearlings, and cull cows. The simulation focus will be 
on modeling production at the cow-calf, stocker, and feedlot stages, plus an 
infusion of calves, and cull cows from the dairy herd.    
 Dairy: Milk and calves are generated, along with cull cows.  
 Hogs: Fed hogs are generated with intermediate outputs of feeder pigs and cull 
sows. Simulation is performing on the period of farrowing, finishing, and farrowing 
to finishing stages.   
 Sheep: Wool, lambs, and cull ewes are generated. 
When an animal disease occurs, the main focus will be on how to stop the disease 
spread and reduce the economic loss of all involved industries. Export losses are usually 
the major consequence to a country‟s economy due to a disease outbreak (Schoenbaum 
and Disney, 2003). Because of possible trade bans imposed on a country undergoing a 
disease outbreak, the cost of processing industry usually increases (Wilson and Kinsella, 
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2004). Therefore, an issue will be how producers can make optimal production decisions 
to reduce the economic loss of such a “disease shock.”  
According to Niemi et al (2008), disease shock can be measured through the 
realized demand and supply shocks. The simulation is conducted in a manner of 
evaluating the optimal value considering the percentage of production that is removed 
from the market and the loss in export demand, plus the duration of the shock. Within 
the ASM model, budgets in ASM are adjusted in the outbreak region to simulate the 
„disease shock.‟ Epidemic data regarding head slaughtered, vaccinated, or restricted will 
be normalized on one animal basis. The „disease shock‟ is simulated to calculate the 
optimal economic balanced cost under various control strategies. 
As a result, FASOM/ASM modeling can provide detailed information regarding the 
number of dead animals, number or percentage price and quantity impact in the meat 
market, and the economic loss during the recovery from facing a disease break. Trade 
impacts can also be estimated by using the FASOM model.  
2.4.7. Integrated Epidemic/Economic Modeling Process 
This section will introduce details of a modeling process using step-by-step analysis 
performed in an AusSpread-ASM integrated model. The general structure and 
assumptions will be discussed in details.   
2.4.8. Theoretical Assumptions 
The first assumption refers to types of disease spread. Two types of disease spread 
are possible. Episodic disease means a single outbreak event, which can usually be 
eradicated in a short time period. Endemic disease means that it could not be eradicated 
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once it is introduced into the region.  
The second assumption refers to disease management options. These control 
options should be realistic and reflect what actually happens in a real outbreak event. 
Some strategies may be quite costly. Therefore, information gathered about control 
implementation cost should be comprehensive and as accurate as possible.   
The third assumption includes alternative factors influencing the modeling results 
that should be considered. For example, export trade ban imposed on the country to 
cause the economic loss should be taken into account when performing analysis within 
the economic model. The key to making this assumption is to identify important issues 
that cannot be answered during the epidemic simulation stage. 
2.4.9. Data Requirements 
For the purpose of matching up data obtained from epidemic simulation with input 
parameters in the ASM Model, a set of standardized inputs should be defined before 
performing economic model simulation. They are summarized in Hagerman (2009) and 
re-organized in Table 1:  
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Table 1: Standardized Input Parameters 
 
Inputs Definition/Explanation  
Altrun The names of the set of alternative scenarios that are being considered. 
This will be each unique identifier for each scenario name if the model 
is being run on average epidemic results, or it could be a unique 
identifier for every iteration within each scenario if the full distribution 
of economic losses is desired. 
Iter The number of stochastic replications runs in the epidemic model. This 
must be at least 1 if the averages from the stochastic epidemic model 
are being run through the economic model, but may go up to the 
maximum number of iterations run in the stochastic epidemic model. 
For the two epidemic models considered here, the standard number of 
iterations was 100. 
Id A unique identifier for every premise in the affected region. This will 
vary by region and perhaps epidemic model. 
Type For each premises in the region, the type of that premises should be 
indicated so the appropriate budgets can be adjusted. At a minimum, 
these should indicate operation type on a premises (beef grazing, beef 
feeding, dairy, sheep, or swine operation). Ideally, more detail would be 
provided as will be discussed later. 
All_stock The total number of animals on each premises. 
Status The herd status at the end of the run for each unique premises id. This 
will generally be limited to the statuses corresponding to the states of 
the epidemic model: susceptible, infected, dead, and vaccinated. Adult 
animals that contract FMD rarely die from the disease, but the current 
U.S. response policy is to "stamp out" all of the infected and dangerous 
contact animals combined with vaccinate-to-die if vaccination is used. 
So the status of each premises should be categorized as either 
susceptible or dead at the end of the outbreak. This is because all sub-
clinically infectious, infectious, and immune animals are slaughtered. 
Restricted This is an indicator variable used to identify herds in the quarantine 
zone (0 = not restricted, 1 = restricted). This variable may need to be 
conditioned on later so that only restricted premises that were not 
slaughtered for infection or vaccination are in a separate group. This 
allows an estimate of the animals that would need to be maintained 
while the movement restriction is in place, but will still be alive at the 
end of that period.  
When_res The number of days that the herd is under quarantine. 
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Table 1 Continued.  
 
Inputs Definition/Explanation  
Days_left_res The number of days that the herd will remain under quarantine at the 
end of the epidemic. Some models do not have this number, rather a 
standardized assumption can be made. For example, a 90-day period in 
which no new cases are identified may be the standard policy before 
movement restrictions are lifted. 
Surv An indicator variable used to identify herds that will be under 
surveillance. 
N_visits The number of times the herd is visited before surveillance ceases. This 
may be two visits in which no signs of FMD are observed, or may be 
weekly for the entirety of the outbreak. This is an assumption of the 
modeler or defined by policy generally.  
Vacc Indicator variable for herds that are vaccinated (0=no vacc, 1=vacc). If 
a vaccinate to live strategy has been employed, these animals will only 
be subject to the increased cost of the vaccination process and 
potentially a decline in the value of the animal after the movement 
restriction ban has been lifted. If a vaccinate to die strategy has been 
employed these animals must be added to the death loss from the 
disease. If vaccination is used, under current U.S. policy those animals 
must also be slaughtered.      
 
Source: Hagerman, A. D., 2009. “Essays on modeling the economic impacts of a foreign animal disease on 
the United States agricultural sector” PhD dissertation, Texas A&M University.   
 
2.4.10. Data Conversion 
Data from the AusSpread model are reported in terms of animal populations in 
different scenario settings. Integration of two models includes the work of converting the 
epidemiologic data to economic data that can be adjusted and change the budget in the 
ASM model. A simple example is illustrated in Hagerman (2009):  
For the animals slaughtered:  
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For the sum over all scenarios indicated by ids (p) where the status is “dead” is divided 
by the sum of all stock in all statuses for premises‟ ids. Each stochastic replication (i) 
and each type of herd (t) can be calculated and the data are transformed from individual 
premises impacts to regional impacts where, for each type of herd (e.g., cow/calf or 
dairy), the percentage of that particular herd type population in the diseased region that 
is susceptible, dead, vaccinated, or quarantined are calculated for each iteration 
(Hagerman, 2009). 
2.4.11. Scenarios and Adjustments in ASM Model 
The High Plains Study examines 64 scenarios, which include 4 infection index herd 
types (a large feedlot, a backgrounder feedlot, a large beef grazing operation, and a 
backyard operation) and 16 sets of combinations of disease mitigation strategies.  The 
mitigation strategies include early versus late detection, adequate versus inadequate 
vaccination, ring and targeted vaccination, and regular versus enhanced surveillance.   
Because of „stamp out‟ and slaughter of infected animals policy, numbers of adult 
cows are adjusted to reflect the death of those who are directly infected and fall into the 
category of having contact with infected animals. The equation of general budget 
adjustment is as follows:          
)_1(*__ ,,Re,,Re ChangePercCattleLBCattleLB AnimalTypegAnimalTypeg  (2) 
where LB_Cattle is the pounds of calves produced by a single cow  
 Reg: the region of infection 
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 Type: the type of budget being adjusted  
 Animal: the output of the budget being adjusted 
 Perc_Change: the percentage of disease loss in the infection region 
The adjustment is made in cow-calf production, stocker operations, and feedlot 
operations as illustrated in Figure 5: 
 
 
Figure 5: ASM beef cattle flow chart 
Source: A. Hagerman, PhD dissertation, Chapter 3, p. 68, 2009. 
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2.4.12. Economic Simulation Output 
The output of the ASM Model can be divided into many categories. The major 
output data we use for this study are welfare changes. In the category of welfare change, 
ASM gives us the changes in many categories from the base scenario (no disease 
outbreak) to a simulated scenario (after a possible simulated outbreak). The output 
reflects the welfare changes by U.S. consumers, U.S. processors, U.S. producers, U.S. 
total welfare, foreign consumers, foreign processors, foreign producers, and foreign total 
welfare.  
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3. EVALUATION OF WELFARE CHANGES BY A POTENTIAL FMD 
OUTBREAK IN THE TEXAS HIGH PLAINS

 
3.1. Background 
Researchers at the Center for Foreign Animal and Zoonotic Disease Defense 
(FAZD) at Texas A&M University (TAMU) conducted a simulation study of the animal 
and economical impact of FMD issues in the Panhandle of Texas based on regional 
livestock industry characteristics and animal movements. A High Plains specific version 
of the AusSpread epidemic simulation model (created by the Australian Department of 
Forestry, Fisheries, and Agriculture) was developed with assistance from the Texas 
Cattle Feeders Association (TCFA) and researchers at West Texas A&M University 
(WTAMU). The model was used to simulate decision and outbreak alternatives. 
Economic analysis of modeling results was conducted to evaluate the disease mitigation 
cost of various outbreak scenarios and mitigation strategies. This analysis was later 
expanded to account for the welfare impacts of not only the High Plains region, but the 
entire U.S. economy.  
                                                     

 This section is a collaborative work with my former colleague, Dr. Amy D. Hagerman, under the Texas 
High Plains Project funded by the FAZD center. The materials in this section are also discussed in the 
PhD dissertation written by Hagerman in 2009.     
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Figure 6: Texas high plains study - integrated modeling process 
 
The High Plains region is representative of a high density livestock area. The study 
(Ward et al. 2007) proceeded in several stages (see Figure 6).The first phase involved a 
survey and interview data gathering component by Dr. Bo Norby at Texas A&M 
University. Initially, interviews with industry representatives were used to establish 
important 'points of contact' for livestock. Subsequently, quantitative surveys of 
livestock producers were used to determine the densities and distributions of farmed 
animals in the study area. The surveys were used to assess direct (animal-to-animal) and 
indirect (animal-to-vector/fomite-to-animal) contacts. The survey also gathered data on 
differences in the density, within-herd distributions, contact rates, and distances of 
movements of the various livestock species included in the study. Results from the 
producer survey indicated that there was little seasonal variation in contact rates for 
feedlots and dairies in this study area, but swine farms, which tended to be smaller in 
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size, did have some seasonal changes in animal movements. Livestock arrived to the 
study area from 29 states, Mexico, and Canada. Animals were sent from the study area to 
14 other states. Distances traveled by livestock in the area ranged from 10 miles to over 
1,000 miles. Information was obtained on the size, composition, borders, and 
distribution of premises.  
In the second phase, the AusSpread model was used to examine the potential impact 
of FMD introduction into an intensive agricultural setting; various disease introduction 
and mitigation strategies were simulated. There were a wide number of strategies 
simulated, which are summarized in the following content. 
In the third phase, we bridge the models between epidemic and economic models. 
In this study, epidemic modeling is the AusSpread model while Cost function model was 
built by Elbakidze and McCarl (2005). The FASOM model was first incorporated in the 
economic modeling setting in this study, followed with further mitigation strategy 
analysis, which includes ANOVA analysis, welfare analysis, and RAC analysis 
(Elbakidze et al., 2009). 
3.1.1. ASM Model Results  
In this section, the welfare changes output data from the ASM model will be used to 
provide the experimental simulation results in the two major methods of basic 
descriptive statistics and risk aversion analysis. The welfare changes with and without 
the three designed mitigation strategies are categorized in three parties including U.S. 
consumer‟s surplus, U.S. processor‟s surplus, and U.S. producers‟ surplus. Another 
specific strategy scenario design is conducted to avoid the possible correlated impacts 
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between strategies in the original experimental design. A local impact in producers‟ 
surplus in the High Plains area will also present the severity of the welfare changes to 
the local economy due to the FMD outbreak.  
The choice of accepting a disease control strategy can be determined by the risk 
aversion level of the decision makers. Elbakidze et al. (2009) find that a potential FMD 
outbreak can cost up to $1 billion in the local cattle industry in the Texas High Plains 
area. From their cost comparison methods, early detection is considered to be the best 
effective mitigation strategies among the three major strategies we have in our original 
experimental design. In addition, the vaccination strategy failed to pass their economic 
cost test due to the cost itself, and enhanced surveillance strategy is not effective either. 
The economic cost models have been well developed and become the initial and 
fundamental framework after this study begins. 
The following content will be organized as follows. Section 1 provides the 
simulated data from the ASM model with basic statistics analysis. Section 2 presents an 
alternative scenario design comparison and results. Section 3 introduces the welfare 
changes data and that includes a stochastic dominance analysis and a risk aversion 
coefficient analysis. The latter analysis will give us BRAC point values if there is a 
crossing situation in the strategy preference comparisons. Local producers‟ welfare 
comparison and results are presented in Section 4. The overall conclusion and policy 
implications are provided in Section 5. 
3.1.2. Data of the Experimental Simulation Scenario  
Based on the High Plains Report Version I by Ward et al. (2007), the AusSpread 
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model contains 13 types of herds in the study. Those are listed as follows:  
1: Feedlot1: Company owned feedlot (>50,000 head). 
2: Feedlot2: Stockholder feedlot (20,000 – 50,000 head). 
3: Feedlot3: Custom feedlot (5,000 – 20,000 head). 
4: Feedlot4: Backgrounder feedlot. 
5: Feedlot5: Yearling-pasture feedlot. 
6: Feedlot6: Dairy Calf-raiser feedlot. 
7: Small beef: < 100 cattle. 
8: Large beef: >100 cattle. 
9: Small dairy: < 1000 number dairy cows. 
10: Large dairy: >1000 number dairy cows. 
11: Backyard: < 10 cattle. 
12: Swine: pig concentrated animal feeding operations. 
13: Small ruminant: sheep and goats. 
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Four types of herds out of the 13 were chosen as points where the initial infection 
begins. They were categorized as: 1) Feedlot Type 1 (large feedlots); 2) Feedlot Type 4 
(small feedlots); 3) Large Beef operation (large beef grazing); and 4) Backyard operation. 
Sixteen different scenarios were designed with different simulated disease management 
settings including the three major mitigation strategies (e.g., early detection, adequate 
vaccination, enhanced surveillance). A total of 64 scenarios were simulated and are 
summarized in Table 2 (Elbakidze et al. 2008). Three sets of experimental design focusing 
on variables of interest with respect to three different mitigation strategies are shown in 
Table 3, Table 4, and Table 5.   
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Table 2: Original Experimental Design for Epidemic Modeling Scenarios 
 
Mitigation Strategies (M) Types of Herds (T) 
Feedlot Type 1 Feedlot Type 4 Large Beef Backyard 
SR; Surv-R; SI; Sdc; DE 1 2 3 4 
SR; Surv-R; SI; Sdc; DL 5 6 7 8 
SR; R-Surv; SI; Sdc; DL; VT; VA 9 10 11 12 
SR; Surv-R; SI; Sdc; DL; VT; VI 13 14 15 16 
Surv-E; SI; Sdc; DE 17 18 19 20 
Surv-E; SI; Sdc; DL 21 22 23 24 
Surv-E; SI; Sdc; DL; VT; VA 25 26 27 28 
Surv-E; SI; Sdc; DL; VT; VI 29 30 31 32 
SI; Sdc; Surv-R; VR; DE; VI 33 34 35 36 
SI; Sdc; Surv-R; DE 37 38 39 40 
SI; Sdc; Surv-R; DL; VR; VA 41 42 43 44 
SI; Sdc; Surv-R; DL; VR; VI 45 46 47 48 
SI; Sdc; Surv-R; DE; VT; VA 49 50 51 52 
SI; Sdc; Surv-R; DL 53 54 55 56 
SI; Sdc; Surv-R; DL; VT 57 58 59 60 
SI; Sdc; Surv-R; DE; VR; VA 61 62 63 64 
 
Source: Elbakidze, L., A. Hagerman, L. Highfield, H. Lin, S. Loneragan, M. Ward, B. McCarl, B. Norby, J. 
Jacobs, R. Srinivasan, L.,. The High Plains Project Report: Version II. Center for Foreign Animal 
and Zoonotic Disease Defense (FAZD), 2008 
 
*Notes: In this table, abbreviations and various terms are used. They are explained as follows:   
Abbreviation: 
Ring Slaughter: SR; Slaughter of infected: SI; Slaughter of dc‟s: Sdc; Regular Surveillance: Surv-R; 
Enhanced Surveillance: Surv-E;   Early Detection: DE; Late Detection: DL; Target Vaccination: VT; 
Adequate Vaccination: VA; Inadequate Vaccination: VI; Ring Vaccination: VR 
Type of randomization: Complete Randomized Design (CRD) 
Type of treatment structure: Mitigation strategy (M) (with 16 levels) crossed with type of herds (T) (with 
4 levels) 
Type of the factors: M - fixed and T - fixed 
Experimental Units (EU) and/or Measurement Units (MU): EU = MU = Individual simulation run 
Sources of variation: M, T, and stochastic simulation runs 8,502 simulation points with 100 runs are 
given from the AusSpread model. With the integrated epidemiologic-economic modeling addressed in the 
previous section, welfare change data gives the results with 100 simulation points for each of the original 
64 scenarios. We sort the 64 scenarios with the three mitigation strategies as the variables of interests.  
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Table 3: Experimental Design Focusing on Variables of Interest – Early versus Late 
Detection 
 
Mitigation Strategy 
(M) 
Type of Herds (T) 
Time of Detection Pair 
Comparison  
Feedlot 
Type 1 
Feedlot 
Type 4 
Large Beef Backyard 
Early Detection A1E 1 2 3 4 
 
 
A2E 17 18 19 20 
 A3E 33 34 35 36 
 A4E 37 38 39 40 
 
 
A5E 49 50 51 52 
 
 
A6E 61 62 63 64 
Late Detection A1L 5 6 7 8 
 
 
A2L 21 22 23 24 
 A3L 45 46 47 48 
 A4L 53 54 55 56 
 
 
A5L 57 58 59 60 
 A6L 41 42 43 44 
 
*Notes: This table explains the scenarios we pick from the overall 64 experimental scenarios in Table1 in 
order to focus on the variable of interest (e.g. early detection in this case). The pair comparison 
codes are designed to distinguish the scenario which is selected for a certain variable of interest. 
For example, A1E represents the first focus scenario group with early detection. A1L is the 
control scenario group with late detection.   
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Table 4: Experimental Design Focusing on Variables of Interest – Adequate versus 
Inadequate Vaccine 
 
Mitigation Strategy 
(M) 
Type of Herds (T) 
Availability of Vaccine Pair 
Comparison  
Feedlot 
Type 1 
Feedlot 
Type 4 
Large Beef Backyard 
Adequate Vaccine 
 
 
B1A 9 10 11 12 
B2A 25 26 27 28 
B3A 41 42 43 44 
B4A 61 62 63 64 
Inadequate Vaccine 
 
 
B1I 13 14 15 16 
B2I 29 30 31 32 
B3I 45 46 47 48 
B4I 33 34 35 36 
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Table 5: Experimental Design Focusing on Variables of Interest – Enhanced 
Surveillance versus Regular Surveillance 
 
Mitigation Strategy 
(M) 
Type of Herds (T) 
Types of Surveillance Pair 
Comparison 
Feedlot 
Type 1 
Feedlot 
Type 4 
Large Beef Backyard 
Adequate Vaccine 
 
 
C1E 17 18 19 20 
C2E 21 22 23 24 
C3E 25 26 27 28 
Inadequate Vaccine 
 
 
C1R 37 38 39 40 
C2R 53 54 55 56 
C3R 57 58 59 60 
 
3.1.2.1. Early vs. Late Detection 
For comparing effects of early detection and late detection, we use descriptive 
statistics measures in Table 6, including Standard Deviation (SD), Coefficient of 
Variation (CV), and distribution percentile (10%, 75%, and 90%) to evaluate the welfare 
change effect of each mitigation strategy on consumers, processors, and producers at a 
national level. Analysis results are presented as follows:  
 For U.S. consumers, early detection management strategy brings greater and better 
welfare changes in average under the scenario of initial infection from the first two 
larger operations (large feedlot and small feedlot). However, for the other two 
smaller operations (large beef grazing and backyard), when comparing early 
detection with late detection under the initial disease introduction, there is no 
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significant improvement in the average welfare changes. 
 For U.S. processors, early detection has less average welfare loss in the scenario of 
small feedlot and backyard operation. However, it shows greater welfare loss in the 
scenario of large feedlot and large grazing operation. 
 For U.S. producers, early detection causes more damage on welfare in average for 
the first two larger operations. In the scenario of large beef grazing and backyard, 
early detection reduces extent in the loss of welfare. 
 Regarding CV values, when using the measure of early detection strategy, their 
absolute values in the scenario of the first two larger operations are less in the 
welfare changes in all three parties. That means early detection provides a less risky 
alternative. On the other hand, in the scenario of disease introduction from the other 
two smaller operations, the bigger absolute CV value in the early detection measure 
implies that early detection strategy does not offer a riskless option.  
The percentile of the distribution also indicates that the welfare change is deviating from 
the mean. In the large feedlot introduction scenario, early detection has a significantly 
positive welfare gains when observing U.S. customers ranged from the 10
th
 and 75
th
 
percentile. Meanwhile, for U.S. producers, early detection has greater welfare loss in the 
90
th
 percentile. Under the small feedlot introduction scenario, the U.S. consumers and 
processors have greater welfare gain and less welfare loss when comparing to the 10
th
 
percentile. In both 75 and 90 percentiles of the U.S. producers‟ welfare comparison, 
early detection causes greater loss in welfare.   
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for the Welfare Changes in Millions 2000 – Early vs. Late 
Detection 
 
Type of Herds Early Detection Late Detection 
Feedlot Type 1 CS PR PS CS PR PS 
Mean 166.61 -14.61 -952.86 157.26 -13.64 -943.73 
SD 29.53 8.21 -56.19 42.57 12.61 41.43 
CV 17.72 -56.19 -3.32 27.07 -92.46 -4.39 
10
th
 Percentile 133.41 -15.20 -992.40 84.21 -15.20 -992.40 
75
th
 Percentile 177.04 -15.20 -925.60 174.57 -15.20 -925.60 
90
th
 Percentile 200.41 0.01 -924.88 200.41 0.01 -882.06 
Feedlot Type 4 CS PR PS CS PR PS 
Mean 158386 -12.23 -946.55 151.54 -13.13 -937.80 
SD 36.05 8.32 -68.03 -13.13 12.19 -92.79 
CV 22.70 -68.03 -3.89 -937.80 45.34 -4.83 
10
th
 Percentile 107.57 -15.20 -992.40 84.21 -16.55 -992.40 
75
th
 Percentile 174.57 -15.20 -925.60 174.57 -15.20 -922.13 
90
th
 Percentile 200.41 0.01 -906.93 200.41 0.01 -866.34 
Large Beef CS PR PS CS PR PS 
Mean 156.35 -14.70 -941.64 159.72 -11.99 -947.93 
SD 41.98 13.18 41.90 38.71 7.92 38.58 
CV 26.85 -89.69 -4.45 -947.93 38.58 -4.07 
10
th
 Percentile 84.21 -44.88 -992.40 107.57 -15.20 -992.40 
75
th
 Percentile 174.57 -15.20 -925.60 174.57 -15.20 -925.60 
90
th
 Percentile 200.41 0.01 -882.06 200.41 0.01 -906.93 
Backyard CS PR PS CS PR PS 
Mean 153.26 -13.77 -939.19 158.49 -16.02 -942.57 
SD 40.75 12.16 41.65 36.10 11.30 39.32 
CV 26.59 -88.31 -4.43 22.78 -70.58 -4.17 
10
th
 Percentile 84.21 -29.67 -992.40 107.57 -29.67 -992.40 
75
th
 Percentile 174.57 -15.20 -922.13 174.57 -15.20 -925.42 
90
th
 Percentile 200.41 0.01 -877.25 200.41 0.01 -891.50 
 
*Notes: The numbers represent the welfare change in million dollars. CS represents the consumer‟s 
surplus, PR represents processors‟ surplus, and PS represents, producers‟ surplus. 
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 In the smaller operation introduction scenarios, the U.S. consumers have less 
welfare gains in the large beef grazing and backyard cases. The U.S. processors 
suffer a much greater welfare loss in the case of large beef grazing at the 10
th
 
percentile of the simulated distributions. The U.S. producers have reduced welfare 
loss with early detection strategy in both large beef and backyard scenarios. 
 The same group in different settings may have shown the same number. We 
interpret this situation as the best or worst scenario which may occur under the 
same simulation scenario.  
 Generally, early detection strategy can bring better average welfare improvement 
and have higher welfare gains even at the 10
th
 percentile of the distribution to the 
U.S. consumers in the large feedlot and small feedlot scenarios. The finding is 
mixed for the U.S. processors. For U.S. producers, early detection helps in reducing 
the average welfare loss when there is a disease introduction in smaller operations 
(large beef grazing and backyard), and it also can prevent the possible greater 
welfare loss at the 90
th
 percentile distribution comparison. 
3.1.2.2. Adequate Vaccine vs. Inadequate Vaccine 
The results of comparison of adequate vaccine versus inadequate vaccine are 
presented in Table 7. The findings are presented as follows:  
 For U.S. consumers, adequate vaccination management strategy brings greater 
welfare gains in average under the scenario of infection introduction in small 
feedlot, large beef grazing, and backyard operations. There is a very small 
difference in welfare gains in the large feedlot introduction scenario.  
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 For U.S. processors, adequate vaccination has greater average welfare loss in the 
scenario of large feedlot, large beef grazing, and backyard operations; however, 
welfare loss is reduced in the scenario of small feedlot introduction. 
 For U.S. producers, adequate vaccination reduces the extent of average welfare loss 
in the large feedlot introduction scenario, but it causes more damages in average on 
the welfare in the other three operations.  
 Regarding CV values, their absolute values in the scenarios of large feedlot 
operations are greater in terms of welfare changes in all three parties with the 
enforcement of adequate vaccination. That means adequate vaccination could 
provide a more risky alternative. On the other hand, in the scenario of disease 
introduction for the other three operations, it shows the smaller value under the 
adequate vaccination measure, which implies that the early detection strategy offers 
a less risky option.  
 In the large feedlot introduction scenario, adequate vaccination is less likely to have 
great welfare loss at the 90
th
 percentile of the simulation distribution for U.S. 
producers. However, in the large beef grazing and backyard introduction scenario, 
U.S. producers have greater welfare loss with adequate vaccination at the 90
th
 
percentile. Meanwhile, for U.S. consumers, adequate vaccination gives greater 
welfare gains at the 10
th
 percentile of the distribution in the small feedlot, large beef, 
and backyard scenarios. 
 Generally, adequate vaccination strategy in the small feedlot, large beef grazing, 
and backyard scenarios can bring better welfare improvement on average and have 
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higher welfare gains at the 10
th
 percentile of the distribution of the U.S. consumers. 
The result is very mixed for the U.S. processors. For U.S. producers, adequate 
vaccination helps in reducing the average welfare loss only when there is a disease 
introduction in the large feedlot. The possible greater welfare loss at the 90 
percentile distribution may occur when the infection introduction point starts from 
large beef grazing and backyard operations.  
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Table 7: Descriptive Statistics for the Welfare Changes in Millions 2000 – Adequate vs. 
Inadequate Vaccine 
 
Type of Herds Adequate Vaccine Inadequate Vaccine 
Feedlot Type 
1 
CS PR PS CS PR PS 
Mean 158.5229 -13.3789 -945.384 158.7029 -11.817 -947.094 
SD 41.21846 11.5389 40.26023 38.28704 7.776123 38.28721 
CV 26.00158 -86.2473 -4.25861 24.12498 -65.8046 -4.0426 
10
th
 Percentile 107.57 -15.20 -992.40 107.57 -15.20 -992.40 
75
th
 Percentile 174.57 -15.20 -925.60 174.57 -15.20 -925.60 
90
th
 Percentile 200.41 0.01 -892.55 200.41 0.01 -906.93 
Feedlot Type 
4 
CS PR PS CS PR PS 
Mean 154.6311 -13.5513 -940.974 152.852 -14.5683 -937.826 
SD 40.29592 10.78084 41.93706 40.9716 12.95539 41.91755 
CV 26.05939 -79.556 -4.45677 26.80475 -88.9285 -4.46965 
10
th
 Percentile 107.52 -15.20 -992.40 84.21 -29.67 -992.40 
75
th
 Percentile 174.57 -15.20 -925.60 174.57 -15.20 -906.93 
90
th
 Percentile 200.41 0.01 -877.25 200.41 0.01 -877.17 
Large Beef CS PR PS CS PR PS 
Mean 160.4835 -17.2703 -943.559 154.9946 -12.5618 -942.229 
SD 37.98871 13.72091 39.70676 44.92158 12.33488 43.39142 
CV 23.67142 -79.4481 -4.20819 28.98268 -98.1938 -4.60519 
10
th
 Percentile 107.57 -44.88 -992.40 75.66 -15.20 -992.40 
75
th
 Percentile 176.56 -15.20 -925.60 174.57 -15.20 -925.60 
90
th
 Percentile 200.41 0.01 -895.92 200.41 0.01 -866.34 
Backyard CS PR PS CS PR PS 
Mean 155.0495 -14.5462 -940.393 153.1546 -14.3865 -938.239 
SD 39.21775 12.20159 40.97698 44.10193 12.00962 45.96905 
CV 25.2937 -83.8817 -4.35743 28.79569 -83.4784 -4.8995 
10
th
 Percentile 107.52 -29.67 -992.40 84.21 -29.67 -992.40 
75
th
 Percentile 174.57 -15.20 -906.93 174.57 -15.20 -924.88 
90
th
 Percentile 200.41 0.01 -877.25 200.41 0.01 -866.34 
 
*Notes: The numbers represent the welfare change in million dollars. CS represents the consumer‟s 
surplus, PR represents processor‟s surplus, and PS represents, producer‟s surplus. Total welfare is 
the summation of the consumers‟, processors‟, and producers‟ surpluses. 
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3.1.2.3. Enhanced vs. Regular Surveillance 
Data pertaining to the comparison of enhanced versus regular surveillance 
strategies in terms of welfare change is presented in Table 8. The findings of the analysis 
are presented as follows:  
 For U.S. consumers, enhanced surveillance management strategy has greater 
average welfare gains under the scenarios of initial infection in two smaller 
operations (large beef grazing and backyard). However, the average welfare in the 
larger operations (large feedlot and small feedlot) do not show improvement by 
comparing enhanced surveillance to the outcomes of regular surveillance strategy.  
 For U.S. processors, enhanced surveillance strategy has less average welfare loss in 
the scenario of large feedlot and backyard operation; however, it shows greater 
welfare loss in the scenario of small feedlot and large grazing operations. 
 For U.S. producers, enhanced surveillance has less average damages on welfare in 
the first two larger operation disease introduction scenarios. In the scenarios of 
large beef grazing and backyard, enhanced surveillance increases the welfare losses 
in extents. 
 While examining CV values, the absolute values in the scenarios of the two smaller 
operations are lower in the welfare changes in all three parties when using the 
measure of enhanced surveillance strategy.  That indicates that enhanced 
surveillance strategy provides a less risky alternative. On the other hand, under the 
scenario of disease introduction in the other two larger operations, the larger 
absolute CV values in the enhanced surveillance measure implies that enhanced 
   
51 
surveillance strategy does not offer a riskless option.  
 In the two smaller feedlot (large beef grazing and backyard) introduction scenarios, 
enhanced surveillance has significantly better welfare gains at the 10
th
 percentile of 
the distribution for U.S. consumers. For U.S. producers, enhanced surveillance has 
greater welfare loss at the 90
th
 percentile. In the other two larger feedlot (large 
feedlot and small feedlot) introduction scenarios, the U.S. consumers have less 
welfare gains at the 10
th
 percentile; however, enhanced surveillance could make less 
welfare loss at the 90
th
 percentile for the U.S. producers.   
 Generally, in the large beef grazing and backyard operation scenarios, enhanced 
surveillance strategy can bring better average welfare gains and have higher welfare 
gains at the 10
th
 percentile of the distribution for the U.S. consumers. However, in 
the same scenarios, the U.S. producers suffer larger welfare loss, and could have 
more severe welfare loss at the 90
th
 percentile. When there is a disease introduction 
in larger operations (large feedlot and small feedlot), the phenomenon is presented 
in an opposite way. For U.S. producers, enhanced surveillance helps in reducing the 
average welfare loss and preventing the possible greater welfare loss at the 90
th
 
percentile of the simulated distribution. On the other hand, for the U.S. consumers, 
there are less average welfare gains and smaller welfare gains at the 10
th
 percentile. 
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Table 8: Descriptive Statistics for the Welfare Changes in Millions 2000 – Enhanced vs. 
Regular Surveillance 
 
 
*Notes: The numbers represent the welfare change in million dollars. CS represents the consumer‟s 
surplus, PR represents processor‟s surplus, and PS represents, producer‟s surplus. Total welfare is 
the summation of the consumer‟s, processor‟s, and producer‟s surpluses. 
Type of Herds Enhanced Surveillance Regular Surveillance 
Feedlot Type 1 CS PR PS CS PR PS 
Mean 158.4863 -13.896 -944.778 169.2103 -14.0851 -956.237 
SD 41.97141 12.47851 40.91029 23.78367 3.966316 27.36572 
CV 26.48268 -89.7995 -4.33015 14.05569 -28.1596 -2.86181 
10
th
 Percentile 84.24 -15.20 -992.40 151.20 -15.20 -992.40 
75
th
 Percentile 176.68 -15.20 -925.60 176.56 -15.20 -925.60 
90
th
 Percentile 200.41 0.01 -882.06 200.41 -15.20 -925.60 
Feedlot Type 4 CS PR PS CS PR PS 
Mean 154.1941 -13.2799 -940.537 160.4158 -13.0808 -947.339 
SD 42.85302 11.01377 44.26015 33.97603 8.8528 34.84645 
CV 27.7916 -82.9355 -4.70584 21.17997 -67.6777 -3.67835 
10
th
 Percentile 84.21 -15.20 -992.40 107.57 -15.20 -992.40 
75
th
 Percentile 174.57 -15.20 -925.60 176.56 -15.20 -925.60 
90
th
 Percentile 200.41 0.01 -866.34 200.41 0.01 -906.93 
Large Beef CS PR PS CS PR PS 
Mean 165.8769 -13.4101 -953.354 155.9441 -11.2312 -944.648 
SD 29.25653 5.498344 31.00046 42.26725 8.836043 41.06731 
CV 17.63749 -41.0015 -3.25172 27.1041 -78.6739 -4.34737 
10
th
 Percentile 133.41 -15.20 -992.40 84.21 -15.20 -992.40 
75
th
 Percentile 174.57 -15.20 -925.60 174.57 -15.20 -925.60 
90
th
 Percentile 200.41 0.01 -924.88 200.41 0.01 -882.06 
Backyard CS PR PS CS PR PS 
Mean 159.0305 -13.8166 -945.325 157.8057 -16.2904 -941.76 
SD 34.20128 9.955954 35.50975 36.74637 11.03961 40.22789 
CV 21.50611 -72.0578 -3.75635 23.28583 -67.7676 -4.27156 
10
th
 Percentile 107.57 -15.20 -992.40 107.57 -29.67 -992.40 
75
th
 Percentile 174.57 -15.20 -925.60 174.57 -15.20 -925.60 
90
th
 Percentile 200.41 0.01 -906.86 200.41 0.01 -877.25 
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3.1.3. An Alternative Scenario Comparison and Results 
In this section, we have re-designed the original experimental design focusing on 
three different mitigation strategies as the variables of interest. In the original design, a 
correlation effect question is being raised because of a set of complicated combination 
settings under the 64 scenarios. In this alternative design, only a specific mitigation 
strategy will be in use in each scenario to avoid the correlation effect. All selected 
scenarios are summarized as in Table 9.  
3.1.3.1. Early vs. Late Detection 
 In this section, a similar comparison to the one in the previous section will be 
conducted. Findings pertaining to differences between the original design and the 
alternative design will be presented. Whether a cross-strategy correlation effect exists in 
the original design will also be examined:         
 With respect to the average welfare changes, all the trends are similar except in the 
case of the large beef grazing scenario. That is, U.S. consumers have higher average 
welfare gains with the implementation of the early detection strategy, and U.S. 
producers have larger average welfare losses. Compared to the original design, in 
the first two larger feedlot scenarios, less average welfare gains or losses are found 
in the first two larger feedlot scenarios. However, in the other two scenarios, the 
average welfare changes are larger in gains and losses.  
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Table 9: Alternative Experimental Design Focusing on Variables of Interest 
 
Early Detection vs. Late Detection 
 
Mitigation Strategy (M) Type of Herds (T) 
Time of Detection 
Pair 
Comparison 
Feedlot Type 
1 
Feedlot Type 
4 
Large Beef Backyard 
Early Detection A1E 1 2 3 4 
 A4E 37 38 39 40 
Late Detection A1L 5 6 7 8 
 A4L 53 54 55 56 
 
Adequate vs. Inadequate Vaccine 
 
Mitigation Strategy (M) Type of Herds (T) 
Availability of Vaccine 
Pair 
Comparison 
Feedlot Type 
1 
Feedlot Type 
4 
Large Beef Backyard 
Adequate Vaccine B1A 9 10 11 12 
 
 
B3A 41 42 43 44 
Inadequate Vaccine B1I 13 14 15 16 
 
 
B3I 45 46 47 48 
 
Enhanced vs. Regular Surveillance 
 
Mitigation Strategy (M) Type of Herds (T) 
Types of Surveillance 
Pair 
Comparison 
Feedlot Type 
1 
Feedlot Type 
4 
Large Beef Backyard 
Enhanced Surveillance  C2E 21 22 23 24 
Regular Surveillance C2R 53 54 55 56 
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 With respect to the percentile comparison, in the first two introduction points 
scenarios, the basic results are similar to the ones above from the original design. 
However, in the last two smaller operation scenarios, results pertaining to U.S. 
producers are very different from the original one. Early detection gives a possible 
larger welfare loss at the 90
th
 percentile, while there is less welfare loss in the 
original design. In addition, in the large beef grazing scenario, the U.S. consumers 
will get greater welfare gains at the 10
th
 percentile. 
 In general, there are similar responses when implementing mitigation strategies in 
different scenarios as shown in Table 10. With the early detection alone, in the 
backyard introduction scenario, U.S. producers would still suffer a possible greater 
loss even though the average welfare loss is reduced in this case. 
3.1.3.2. Adequate vs. Inadequate Vaccination 
Data concerning welfare changes are organized in Table 11 and the findings of the 
analysis will be presented as follows:   
 With respect to the average welfare changes, the results are opposite to the ones of 
the original design in the large feedlot and backyard introduction scenarios. In the 
large feedlot scenario, U.S. consumers have higher average welfare gains with the 
implementation of adequate vaccination strategy, and U.S. producers have larger 
average welfare loss. In the backyard operation scenario, U.S. consumers have less 
welfare gains, while U.S. producers have smaller average welfare losses. Another 
finding in these two cases is that the gap or the average difference between 
adequate and inadequate vaccination mitigation strategies is much larger than in the 
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original design. 
 With respect to the percentile comparison, there are two findings. First, for U.S. 
producers, adequate vaccination gives a possible larger welfare loss at the 90
th
 
percentile in the large feedlot scenario, but a less welfare loss in the backyard 
scenario. Second, for U.S. consumers, adequate vaccination will get smaller welfare 
gains at the 10
th
 percentile in the backyard scenario. 
 In general, there are different responses regarding welfare changes for U.S. 
consumers and producers in the large feedlot and backyard scenarios. An important 
correlation problem may exist in the original design for the vaccination strategy as 
the variable of interest. Another noteworthy finding is that the impact of vaccination 
strategy on welfare changes is actually greater than the one measured in the original 
design. 
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Table 10: Descriptive Statistics for the Welfare Changes in Millions 2000: Early vs. Late 
Detection 
 
Type of Herds Early Detection Late Detection  
Feedlot Type 
1 
CS PR PS CS PR PS 
Mean 165.47 -16.56 -949.87 154.42 -10.81 -943.32 
SD 34.38 12.37 34.96 43.01 8.91 42.39 
CV 20.77 -74.65 -3.68 27.85 -82.42 -4.49 
10
th
 Percentile 133.36 -44.88 -992.40 84.21 -15.20 -992.40 
75
th
 Percentile 177.04 -15.20 -925.60 174.57 -15.20 -925.60 
90
th
 Percentile 200.41 0.01 -909.05 200.41 0.01 -866.34 
Feedlot Type 
4 
CS PR PS CS PR PS 
Mean 156.16 -11.07 -944.94 150.02 -15.10 -934.07 
SD 40.24 8.27 40.33 44.91 14.14 45.84 
CV 25.76 -74.75 -4.26 29.93 -93.61 -4.90 
10
th
 Percentile 104.80 -15.20 -992.40 84.21 -44.88 -992.40 
75
th
 Percentile 174.57 -15.20 -925.60 174.57 -15.20 -906.93 
90
th
 Percentile 200.41 0.01 -891.50 200.41 0.01 -866.34 
Large Beef CS PR PS CS PR PS 
Mean 162.99 -12.82 -950.87 158.09 -11.58 -946.46 
SD 32.56 6.33 33.48 41.44 8.60 40.90 
CV 19.97 -49.37 -3.52 26.21 -74.29 -4.32 
10
th
 Percentile 107.57 -15.20 -992.40 84.21 -15.20 -992.40 
75
th
 Percentile 174.57 -15.20 -925.60 174.57 -15.20 -925.60 
90
th
 Percentile 200.41 0.01 -906.93 200.41 0.01 -882.06 
Backyard CS PR PS CS PR PS 
Mean 155.68 -14.04 -941.58 158.00 -15.54 -942.28 
SD 36.63 11.70 37.45 39.82 10.80 42.85 
CV 23.52 -83.38 -3.97 25.20 -69.49 -4.54 
10
th
 Percentile 107.57 -16.65 -992.40 107.57 -29.67 -992.40 
75
th
 Percentile 174.57 -15.20 -924.19 174.57 -15.20 -925.60 
90
th
 Percentile 200.41 0.01 -895.92 200.41 0.01 -877.25 
 
*Notes: The numbers represent the welfare change in million dollars. CS represents the consumer‟s 
surplus, PR represents processors‟ surplus, and PS represents, producers‟ surplus. Total welfare is 
the summation of the consumers‟, processors‟, and producers‟ surplus. 
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Table 11: Descriptive Statistics for the Welfare Changes in Millions 2000 - Adequate vs.    
           Inadequate Vaccine 
 
Type of Herds Adequate Vaccine Inadequate Vaccine 
Feedlot Type 
1 
CS PR PS CS PR PS 
Mean 160.47 -15.55 -945.55 154.42 -10.81 -943.32 
SD 39.57 13.36 38.38 42.90 8.89 42.28 
CV 24.66 -85.93 -4.06 27.78 -82.22 -4.48 
10
th
 Percentile 107.57 -44.88 -992.40 84.21 -15.20 -992.40 
75
th
 Percentile 177.04 -15.20 -925.60 174.57 -15.20 -925.60 
90
th
 Percentile 200.41 0.01 -906.93 200.41 0.01 -866.34 
Feedlot Type 
4 
CS PR PS CS PR PS 
Mean 154.08 -12.17 -941.91 150.02 -15.10 -934.07 
SD 40.19 10.16 40.88 44.79 14.10 45.72 
CV 26.08 -83.50 -4.34 29.86 -93.38 -4.90 
10
th
 Percentile 105.24 -15.20 -992.40 84.21 -44.88 -992.40 
75
th
 Percentile 174.57 -15.20 -925.60 174.57 -15.20 -906.93 
90
th
 Percentile 200.41 0.01 -877.25 200.41 0.01 -866.34 
Large Beef CS PR PS CS PR PS 
Mean 161.80 -15.80 -946.74 158.09 -11.58 -946.46 
SD 36.90 12.85 36.89 41.34 8.58 40.80 
CV 22.81 -81.34 -3.90 26.15 -74.11 -4.31 
10
th
 Percentile 107.57 -44.88 -992.40 84.21 -15.20 -992.40 
75
th
 Percentile 176.68 -15.20 -925.60 174.57 -15.20 -925.60 
90
th
 Percentile 200.41 0.01 -906.93 200.41 0.01 -882.06 
Backyard CS PR PS CS PR PS 
Mean 148.18 -10.63 -936.73 157.88 -15.54 -942.08 
SD 44.84 12.12 43.88 39.71 10.77 42.73 
CV 30.26 -114.06 -4.68 25.15 -69.33 -4.54 
10
th
 Percentile 84.21 -15.20 -992.40 107.57 -29.67 -992.40 
75
th
 Percentile 174.57 0.01 -906.93 174.57 -15.20 -925.60 
90
th
 Percentile 200.41 0.01 -866.34 200.41 0.01 -877.25 
 
*Notes: The numbers represent the welfare change in million dollars. CS represents the consumer‟s 
surplus, PR represents processor‟s surplus, and PS represents, producer‟s surplus. Total welfare is 
the summation of the consumers‟, processors‟, and producers‟ surpluses. 
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3.1.3.3. Enhanced vs. Regular Surveillance 
Data concerning the comparison between enhanced surveillance and regular 
surveillance strategy will be presented in Table 12. Welfare results of the analysis will be 
presented as follows:  
 With respect to the average welfare changes, there are two different results from the 
ones in the original design. First, in the small feedlot scenario, U.S. producers do 
not get any benefit from using the enhanced surveillance strategy in the situation of 
increasing welfare loss. Second, U.S. consumers have smaller welfare gains with 
enhanced surveillance in the introduction scenario of backyard operation. 
 With respect to the percentile comparisons, a similar trend is shown from the trend 
of average welfare changes. In the large feedlot and small feedlot scenarios, the gap 
of consumers‟ welfare gain at the 10th percentile and producers‟ welfare loss at the 
90
th
 percentile between enhanced and regular surveillance is getting close to a much 
smaller extent. On the other hand, the same gap is expanded to a larger extent in the 
scenarios of large beef grazing and backyard introduction. 
 In general, there are two major findings in this analysis. First, enhanced 
surveillance could be less effective in the measure of average welfare changes. 
From the analysis, we have found that less U.S. consumer‟s gains are shown in the 
backyard scenario and greater U.S. producer‟s welfare losses are presented in the 
small feedlot scenario. Second, from the analysis of percentile comparison, we have 
found that enhanced surveillance could have greater impacts on welfare changes 
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under the scenario of having disease introduction in smaller operations, and smaller 
impacts in the introduction scenario of larger feedlots. 
 
Table 12: Descriptive Statistics for the Welfare Changes in Millions 2000: Enhanced vs. 
Regular Surveillance 
 
Type of 
Herds 
Enhanced Surveillance Regular Surveillance 
Feedlot Type 
1 
CS PR PS CS PR PS 
Mean 159.28 -18.54 -941.42 164.32 -13.07 -952.06 
SD 43.20 16.96 40.93 29.06 5.28 31.47 
CV 27.12 -91.50 -4.35 17.68 -40.39 -3.31 
10
th
 Percentile 105.24 -44.88 -992.40 107.57 -15.20 -992.40 
75
th
 Percentile 181.00 -15.20 -925.60 174.57 -15.20 -925.60 
90
th
 Percentile 200.41 0.01 -892.31 200.41 0.01 -906.93 
Feedlot Type 
4 
CS PR PS CS PR PS 
Mean 146.59 -8.76 -937.06 149.78 -12.49 -936.40 
SD 47.61 10.05 46.95 41.82 13.63 40.58 
CV 32.48 -114.80 -5.01 27.92 -109.09 -4.33 
10
th
 Percentile 75.66 -15.20 -992.40 84.21 -18.17 -992.40 
75
th
 Percentile 174.57 0.01 -906.93 174.57 0.01 -906.93 
90
th
 Percentile 200.41 13.13 -866.27 200.41 0.01 -866.34 
Large Beef CS PR PS CS PR PS 
Mean 164.32 -13.07 -952.06 144.52 -8.56 -934.58 
SD 29.06 5.28 31.47 51.39 10.96 49.32 
CV 17.68 -40.39 -3.31 35.56 -128.04 -5.28 
10
th
 Percentile 107.57 -15.20 -992.40 49.82 -15.20 -992.40 
75
th
 Percentile 174.57 -15.20 -925.60 174.57 0.01 -906.93 
90
th
 Percentile 200.41 0.01 -906.93 200.41 13.13 -855.85 
Backyard CS PR PS CS PR PS 
Mean 149.78 -12.49 -936.40 150.26 -17.71 -931.74 
SD 41.82 13.63 40.58 47.58 14.08 50.24 
CV 27.92 -109.09 -4.33 31.66 -79.53 -5.39 
10
th
 Percentile 84.21 -18.17 -992.40 52.05 -44.88 -992.40 
75
th
 Percentile 174.57 0.01 -906.93 174.57 -15.20 -918.33 
90
th
 Percentile 200.41 0.01 -866.34 200.41 0.01 -855.85 
 
*Notes: The numbers represent the welfare change in million dollars. CS represents the consumer‟s 
surplus, PR represents processor‟s surplus, and PS represents, producer‟s surplus. Total welfare is 
the summation of the consumers‟, processors‟, and producers‟ surpluses. 
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3.1.4. Stochastic Dominance and Risk Aversion Coefficient Analysis 
A risk analysis will be conducted by using the concept of stochastic dominance 
when a decision maker faces a choice of using the ex post mitigation strategies. 
Stochastic dominance will tell us which mitigation strategy is preferred to use. However, 
there is always a crossing situation when the choice is not dominant to the other. A 
Breakeven Risk Aversion Coefficient (BRAC) analysis will come along to solve this 
situation. In addition, we can find out the Risk Aversion Coefficient (RAC) points where 
the preference switches from one choice to the other. 
3.1.4.1. Basic Theoretical Concept of Stochastic Dominance and BRAC1 
Stochastic dominance (SD) can inform decision makers how to pick a choice under 
weak assumptions about risk attitudes. Three basic assumptions are made, including a) 
each individual is an expected utility maximizer, b) two alternatives can be used to 
compare and they are mutually exclusive, and c) the stochastic dominance analysis is 
based on the population probability distribution (McCarl 1996).  
3.1.4.1.1. First Degree Stochastic Dominance 
Assume x is the level of wealth, while f(x) and g(x) give the probability of each 
level of wealth for alternatives f and g. The difference in the expected utility between the 
prospects is as follows:  





 -
dxg(x) u(x) - 
-
dxf(x) u(x)      (3) 
The equation can be rewritten as: 
                                                     
 This part adopts the materials from McCarl, B.A. "Choosing among Risky Alternatives Using Stochastic 
Dominance." Unpublished Manuscript, Texas A&M University, August 2008. 
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 dx)g(x)-f(x)( u(x)
-


     
(4) 
If f is preferred to g, then the sign of the above equation would be positive. 
Conversely, if g is preferred to f, the sign of the above equation is negative. 
Apply the integration by parts formula to  
a = u(x)                          (5)         
b = (F(x) - G(x))                   (6) 
where 


X
XF
-
dxf(x))(  



X
XG
-
dxg(x))(    
  dx ) g(x) - (f(x)db
(x)dxu da 


      
Under this substitution, the integration of 
 
-
dx)g(x)-f(x)( u(x)


equals  dx)G(x)-F(x)( (x)u'G(x))] -  F(x)( [u(x)
-
- 



 
  
   (7) 
 
In the left part when F(x) and G(x) are evaluated at x equals -∞, both equal zero; x 
equals +∞. Both equal one and plus infinity where they equal one so the left part equals 
zero. Now let us look at the right part, which is: 
 
-
dx)G(x)-F(x)( (x)u'



          
(8)
 
 
If the overall sign is positive, then f dominates g. 
3.1.4.1.2. Second Degree Stochastic Dominance 
The above FSD derivation says expected utility of f minus g can be expressed as  
 
-
dx)G(x)-F(x)( (x)u'



              
(9) 
Applying integration by parts 
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dx ) G(x)- (F(x) db
(x) ua 


                (10) 
so that: 
 ) (x)G  - (x)(F b
dx(x) uda 
22

      (11) 
where F2 and G2 are the second integral of the cdfs 
                 


X
XF
-
dxF(x))(
2   (12) 



X
XG
-
dxG(x))(
2
                      
(13) 
Under these circumstances, if we plug in our integration by parts formula we get the 
equation 
 dx)(x)G-(x)F( (x)'u'(x))]G - (x) F( (x)[u'-
-
22-22 



 
     
(14) 
The formula above has two parts. Let us address the right-hand part of it first. 
 dx)(x)G-(x)F( (x)'u'(x))]G - (x) F( (x)[u'-
-
22-22 



 
     
(15) 
Right-hand part contains the second derivative of the utility function times the difference 
in the integrals of the cdf with a positive sign in front of it.   
 dx)(x)G-(x)F( (x)'u'
-
22



                          
(16) 
To guarantee that f dominates g, the sign of this whole term must be positive. Two 
assumptions need to be added in the second stochastic dominance. First, the second 
derivative of the utility function with respect to x is negative everywhere. Second, F2(x) 
is less than or equal to G2(x) for all x with strict inequality for some x. 
One extension of stochastic dominance that has been utilized is generalized 
stochastic dominance (GSD). One again starts from the variant of the expected utility 
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function: 
 
-
dx)G(x)-F(x)( (x)u'



                   
(17) 
Meyer and Meyer (2005) investigated the magnitude of this expression under the 
conditions that the Pratt risk aversion coefficient falls into an interval: 
 (x)
2
r
)('
)("
 (x)
1
r 
xu
xu
                  
 (18) 
Meyer and Meyer (2005) posed an optimal control format for this examination. 
where the variable is u(x) 
(x)r
)('
)("
 (x)r
(x)u')
(x)u'
(x)u"
((x))'u'(..
dx)G(x)-F(x)( (x)u'
21
-


 


xu
xu
ts
Max
     
(19) 
When this problem is solved, it looks for the choice of utility function, which has 
r(x) constrained in the interval. The objective function is the expected utility difference, 
which if positive means f dominates g. When we maximize it, we find the greatest 
expected utility difference over all possible utility choices such that r(x) is in that 
interval. If the greatest utility difference is negative, then f must dominate g.   
Meyer and Meyer (2005) recognized that this is a simple optimal control problem 
since it is linear in the control variables. The problem has what it is called a Bang-Bang 
solution.   
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0
*
dx)G(x)-F(x)( (x)u' if )*(x
2
r
0
*
dx)G(x)-F(x)( (x)u' if )*(x
1
r
)*r(x



















x
x    (20) 
Meyer originally wrote a computer program to do this, but implements it with u(xi) 
= - e
-rxi
. Yet another approach has been used to deal with crossings. Hammond (1974) 
showed that, given two alternatives that cross once, under constant absolute risk aversion 
there is a break-even risk aversion coefficient (BRAC) that differentiates between those 
two alternatives.  
Hammond (1974) also noted the expected utility problem given a constant absolute 
RAC (r) is 
 
-
dxf(x) rx-e-


                        
(21) 
Equation 21 is a form of the mathematical statistics moment generating function. This 
does not imply that the risk aversion parameter is a constant, rather it could be increasing, 
decreasing, or of any other form as long as it remains between the two bounds.   
GSD generalizes the other stochastic dominance forms when r1 = 0 and r2 =  we 
get second degree, while r1 = - and r2 =  is the same as first degree. This has been a 
fairly heavily used technique in the 1990s. The biggest problem in using this technique is 
always concerning finding the r1, r2 values.   
The moment generating function under normality, given the risk aversion parameter 
r for distribution f, is as follows: 
     e)(
2
ur-
2










rf
f
rm

   (22) 
If we solve this for the break-even risk aversion parameter, first thing we need to do 
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is to set the expected utilities equal:  








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Or 
    2
22
ur 
2
22
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r
g
g
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f
f


 
(24) 
This can be manipulated to  
0)uu(r 
2
2
2
2
2 












 gf
gf
r


   
(25) 
which yields two roots 
 
)(
)uu(2
r 
0r
22
gf
gf
 



       
(26) 
 
Notice then for any two normally distributed prospects, we can find a break-even 
risk aversion parameter using this formula. 
McCarl wrote a program (RISKROOT) to implement Hammond‟s approach with an 
empirical discrete distribution of unknown form. RISKROOT takes data for two 
alternatives and searches for the break-even risk aversion parameters between those two 
alternatives by solving the following equation for all applicable values of r.   
 0)(x)g-(x)(f e- ii
-rx i 
i
     (27) 
RAC can show the degree of a particular decision maker‟s aversion to risk. 
Therefore, we can make further assumptions to distinguish from one choice to another 
choice, which is to a range where RAC falls. Generalized stochastic dominance or mean 
variance programming models are often employed in this type of analysis. McCarl (1988) 
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developed an approach based on Hammond‟s study (1974), in which the dataset are 
explored to see what risk aversion coefficients differentiate among prospects under the 
assumption of a constant risk aversion. When using this method, one does not need to 
specify bounds of the RAC. It calculates given bounds of the RAC. The program is 
called RISKROOT. The RISKROOT program finds RACs in such a manner that, on 
each side of them, a given distribution dominates. However, there may be multiple 
values for these RACs with multiple preference shifts. Such RACs are hereafter called 
break-even risk aversion coefficients (BRACs) (McCarl 1996). 
Another version of the BRAC analysis has been called Stochastic Efficiency with 
Respect to a Function (SERF). The advantage of using the SERF method in calculating 
BRAC points is that this method allows for an estimation of the utility-weighted risk 
premiums. The feature permits the payoffs comparing between risk alternatives 
(Hardaker et al. 2004). Instead of using RISKROOT, we use SERF as implemented in 
Simetar (Richardson 2007). We also employ the graphical display of BRAC points using 
SERF. 
3.1.4.2. Early vs. Late Detection 
The stochastic dominance and calculated BRACs can tell us how each mitigation 
strategy dominates and where one alternative has passed the other in the introduction 
scenario of four assumed cattle operations. The analysis is summarized as follows. 
 In Figure 7, for U.S. consumers, early detection strategy dominates from risk 
neutral (RAC=0) to risk averse (RAC>0) in the first two larger operation (large 
feedlot and small feedlot) introduction scenarios. However, in the smaller operation 
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(large beef grazing and backyard) introduction scenarios, early detection strategy is 
not preferred. 
 In Figure 8, for U.S. producers, opposite to the results for U.S. consumers, in the 
first two large operation introduction scenarios, early detection is not preferred from 
risk neutral (RAC=0) to risk averse (RAC>0). In the large beef grazing scenario, 
early detection dominates from risk neutral to risk adverse. In the backyard 
introduction scenario, early detection is preferred as the RAC is greater than 0, and 
less than 0.0607. When RAC is bigger than 0.0607, early detection strategy does 
not dominate in the U.S. producers‟ welfare changes.  
 For the overall U.S. welfare changes, in the large feedlot introduction scenario, 
early detection is not preferred as seen in Figure 9. In the small feedlot introduction 
scenario, early detection becomes preferred strategy only when RAC is larger than 
0.8333. In the larger beef grazing scenario, early detection dominated as RAC lies 
between 0 and 0.0607. In the smallest feedlot (backyard) scenario, the result also 
shows that early detection dominates as RAC is between 0 and 0.0722. 
 In general, U.S. consumers economically prefer the early detection strategy when 
there is a larger operation introduction (e.g., large feedlot and small feedlot). U.S. 
producers can accept early detection strategy only in the scenario of large beef 
introduction or in the situation where the decision-makers are neutral and less risk 
adverse (RAC<0.0668) in the backyard introduction scenario. For the overall U.S. 
welfare changes, early detection will only be considered beneficial in three 
situations. One is at a high risk averse level (RAC>0.8333) in the small feedlot 
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scenario, and the other two are at similar low risk adverse levels, 0<RAC<0.0607 in 
the large feedlot introduction scenario, and 0<RAC<0.0722 in the backyard 
introduction scenario.  
 
 
 
Figure 7: Early vs. late detection strategy dominance with respect to U.S. consumers' 
surplus 
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Figure 8: Early vs. late detection strategy dominance with respect to U.S. producers' 
surplus 
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Figure 9: Early vs. late detection strategy dominance with respect to U.S. total welfare 
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3.1.4.3. Adequate vs. Inadequate Vaccines 
Data concerning comparison of adequate versus inadequate vaccines is presented in 
Figure 10, Figure 11, and Figure 12 respectively. The analysis is summarized as follows: 
• In Figure 10, for U.S. consumers, adequate vaccination strategy dominates from 
risk neutral (RAC=0) to risk averse (RAC>0) in the two smaller operations (large 
beef grazing and backyard). In the two larger operation (large feedlot and small 
feedlot) introduction scenarios, adequate vaccination strategy is not preferred. 
• In Figure 11, for U.S. producers, in the large feedlot introduction scenario, adequate 
vaccination strategy is preferred. In the small feedlot scenario, the adequate 
vaccination strategy dominates at the higher risk aversion level (e.g. RAC> 0.0491). 
In the large beef grazing scenario, adequate vaccination is only accepted when the 
risk adverse level is between 0.011 and 0.2789. In the backyard scenario, adequate 
vaccination is not preferred. 
• For the overall U.S. welfare changes, in the large feedlot introduction scenario, 
adequate vaccination is preferred from risk neutral to risk averse. In the small 
feedlot introduction scenario, adequate vaccination becomes the preferred strategy 
only when RAC is larger than 0.0741. In the larger beef grazing scenario, adequate 
vaccination does not dominate over other strategies. In the backyard scenario, the 
result also shows that adequate vaccination dominates when RAC is between 
0.0571 and 0.8443. 
• In general, U.S. consumers preferred adequate vaccination strategy when there was 
a disease introduction from smaller operations (e.g., large beef grazing and 
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backyard). U.S. producers can accept adequate vaccination strategy in the larger 
operation introduction scenarios. Adequate vaccination dominates in the following 
scenarios at different risk adverse level: from risk neutral to risk averse in the large 
feedlot scenario, RAC> 0.0491 in the small feedlot scenario, and 
0.2789<RAC<0.7104 in the large beef grazing scenario. For overall U.S. welfare 
changes, adequate vaccination is preferred in the large feedlot scenario. This 
strategy will be useful at the risk averse level (RAC>0.0741) in the small feedlot 
scenario, and 0.0571<RAC<0.8443 in the backyard introduction scenario. 
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Figure 10: Adequate vs. inadequate vaccines strategy dominance with respect to 
consumer's surplus 
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Figure 11: Adequate vs. inadequate vaccines strategy dominance with respect to 
producer's surplus 
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Figure 12: Adequate vs. inadequate vaccines strategy dominance with respect to U.S. 
total welfare 
 
3.1.4.4. Enhanced vs. Regular Surveillance 
Data concerning the comparison of enhanced surveillance and regular surveillance 
strategy will be presented in Figures 13, 14, and 15. The analysis is summarized as 
follows: 
 In Figure 13, for U.S. consumers, enhanced surveillance strategy dominates from 
risk neutral (RAC=0) to risk averse (RAC>0) in the two smaller operations (large 
beef grazing and backyard). In the two larger operation (large feedlot and small 
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feedlot) introduction scenarios, enhanced surveillance strategy is not preferred. 
 In Figure 14, for U.S. producers, enhanced surveillance strategy is preferred in the 
two larger feedlot (large feedlot and small feedlot) introduction scenarios. In the 
two smaller operation (large beef grazing and backyard) scenarios, enhanced 
surveillance strategy does not show a better result. 
 For the overall U.S. welfare changes, enhanced surveillance is preferred from risk 
neutral to risk averse in the large feedlot introduction scenario. In the small feedlot 
introduction scenario, adequate vaccination becomes preferred only when RAC is 
larger than 0.1118. In the larger beef grazing scenario, enhanced surveillance does 
not dominate over the other strategy. In the backyard scenario, the result also shows 
that adequate vaccination dominates as RAC is between 0 and 0.1301. 
 In general, U.S. consumers preferred enhanced surveillance strategy when there is a 
disease introduction from smaller operations (e.g., large beef grazing and backyard). 
U.S. producers can accept enhanced surveillance strategy in the larger operation 
(e.g., large feedlot and small feedlot) introduction scenarios. For overall U.S. 
welfare changes, enhanced surveillance is good in the large feedlot scenario. This 
strategy is also preferred at the risk averse level (RAC>0.1118) in the small feedlot 
scenario, and 0<RAC<0.1301 in the backyard introduction scenario. 
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Figure 13: Enhanced vs. regular surveillance strategy dominance with respect to 
consumers‟ surplus 
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Figure 14: Enhanced vs. regular surveillance strategy dominance with respect to 
producers‟ surplus 
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Figure 15: Enhanced vs. regular surveillance strategy dominance with respect to U.S. 
total welfare 
 
3.1.4.5. BRAC Results from Alternative Design for the Mitigation Strategies 
From the alternative designs, we want to find out whether this setting could give a 
reasonable result from the BRAC analysis compared to the outputs from the original 
design. Findings of major differences will be summarized as follows: 
 Early Detection: In the small feedlot scenario, U.S. producers could get better 
results by using the early detection strategy if RAC is greater than 0.0703. In the 
large beef grazing scenario, this strategy will benefit U.S. consumers. In the 
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backyard scenario, early detection is preferred for U.S. consumers if RAC>0.0104. 
For overall U.S. welfare changes, early detection is acceptable in the range of 
0.04<RAC<0.1167. 
 Adequate Vaccination: In the large feedlot scenario, U.S. consumers prefer the 
adequate vaccination strategy. However, U.S. producers can only accept adequate 
vaccination in the range of 0.0227<RAC<0.171. For overall U.S. welfare changes, 
adequate vaccination is not preferred. In the small feedlot scenario, U.S. consumers 
also prefer adequate vaccination. In the backyard scenario, U.S. consumers do not 
prefer early detection, while U.S. producers could accept the strategy in the range 
of RAC<0.06. For U.S. welfare changes, it is acceptable if RAC<0.1444. 
 Enhanced Surveillance: For this strategy, when compared to the original design, 
most of the characteristics are very similar. However, in several scenarios, a range 
of enhanced surveillance strategies exists. For example, in the large feedlot scenario, 
enhanced surveillance is preferred for U.S. producers if RAC<0.152 and for U.S. 
welfare changes if RAC<0.0348. In the small feedlot introduction case, enhanced 
surveillance becomes acceptable for U.S. producers when RAC is greater than 
0.0439. In the backyard scenario, U.S. consumers prefer the mitigation strategy 
when RAC is greater than 0.0017. 
 In general, this alternative design gives us another look at the stochastic dominance 
and BRAC situation with three major mitigation strategies. Among these strategies, 
there are no further correlated effects. When U.S. producers change their 
preferences in implementing early detection strategies in the large beef grazing 
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scenario, they can begin adopting early detection strategy with higher risk aversion 
attitudes in the small feedlot and large beef scenarios. The result suggests that U.S. 
consumers change their preferences in adopting adequate vaccination in the large 
feedlot and small feedlot scenarios. U.S. producers also change from late detection 
to early detection in large feedlot and backyard scenarios within a range of specific 
RAC. For enhanced surveillance, there exists a certain range of RAC in several 
scenarios when enhanced surveillance is accepted. 
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3.1.5. Overall Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications  
A number of analyses in previous sections present whether different mitigation 
strategies are preferred in the standpoint of welfare changes comparisons. The three 
mitigation strategies have different impacts on U.S. consumers and U.S. producers.  
Early detection has the advantage as a strategy in reducing risks. In large and small 
feedlots index herds, it helps consumers to have higher lower bound welfare gains, as 
well as outbreaks starting in large beef grazing and backyard operations. The variability 
of the change in the range of producer‟s losses is reduced. In addition, disease infection 
starting from small feedlots and large beef grazing operations lead to a preferred 
decision for using early detection strategy as risk aversion rises. Early detection is 
preferred for the risk neutral and risk adverse for U.S. consumers in the large feedlot, 
small feedlot, and large beef grazing index herd case, while it is preferred in the 
backyard case when risk aversion rises. Meanwhile, U.S. producers could prefer early 
detection in the small feedlot, large beef grazing, and backyard as the risk aversion level 
rises. 
Vaccine availability results suggest that improving vaccine availability during an 
incursion is not a cost effective mitigation option when seeking to minimize the average 
loss. Adequate vaccination does not show effectiveness at a national welfare level. 
However, as risk aversion rises for U.S. consumers in the large feedlot, small feedlot, 
and large beef grazing index herds, it shows the preference toward adequate vaccine 
availability. U.S. producers could prefer adequate vaccine strategy in the small feedlot 
index herd as the risk aversion rises.  
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Enhanced surveillance has proved to be a great strategy to reduce U.S. producer‟s 
welfare losses for outbreaks starting in large feedlots and small feedlot operations. This 
strategy also helps to increase U.S. consumer‟s welfare gains in large beef grazing and 
backyard operation index herds. Both large feedlot and small feedlot introductions lead 
to a preference toward enhanced surveillance as risk aversion rises. However, there is a 
preference toward regular surveillance as risk aversion rises for large beef index herds 
and backyard index herds. This implies that this strategy is to reduce risk in areas with 
larger feedlots. For U.S. consumers, regular surveillance strategy dominates in the 
situation of larger feedlot introduction, while enhanced surveillance dominates in the 
smaller feedlot introduction. U.S. producers have a preference for enhanced surveillance 
strategy when there are larger feedlot introductions. 
Further research that includes a more comprehensive and detailed analysis for each 
individual type of feedlot can be conducted. We might find reasons that can contribute to 
differences among the index feedlots. The analysis from this study can help to develop 
Agricultural policies for FMD prevention and mitigation, which can be enforced with 
considerations of other scenarios, varied reactions in different types of feedlot operations, 
and diverse perspectives from all parties involved in the national welfare composition.  
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4. RISK MODELING FOR EVALUATION OF MITIGATION STRATEGIES 
An FMD outbreak poses a potential threat for the United States. This raises serious 
concerns and a number of parties are considering how to reduce the possible huge loss. 
Risk is a major factor across major control strategies. In this study, we evaluate the 
economic consequences of a number of control strategies considering both their average 
welfare and their risk implications. 
Many risk modeling approaches have been developed to evaluate possible decision 
choices. Stochastic modeling is not used to yield the best beneficial option for decision 
makers; however, it is utilized to assist them to find a robust position across all possible 
events (McCarl and Spreen 1997). There are two major types of stochastic programming 
risk models (McCarl and Spreen 1997). In the first type, all decisions must be made 
when the event occurs and all the possible outcomes are taken into account when 
decisions are made. However, in the second type decisions can be made when the event 
occurs, but subsequent decisions may be made to change or complement the initial 
decision adapting to the realized uncertainty.  
The modeling approach used in this Section is the first type, which is stochastic 
modeling programming without recourse (McCarl and Spreen 1997). All decisions must 
be made when the event occurs and no other decision will be made after any uncertainty 
is resolved. In this Section, we will use the welfare results derived from ASM Modeling 
in the previous Section to evaluate the „optimal‟ solution under all circumstances in a 
risk modeling analysis. The factor of what risk attitude is chosen by decision makers will 
be incorporated into this risk modeling analysis as well. According to McCarl and 
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Spreen (1997), risks may arise in different ways including objective function coefficients, 
technical coefficients, or right-hand side coefficients. They may contribute to the overall 
risk level separately or collectively. As the previous Section targets using welfare 
comparison to determine the „optimal‟ solution for decision makers, this Section will 
include the factor of risk variable to analyze whether the „optimal‟ solution will be 
influenced by taking this variable into account.  
This Section will include three parts. Two risk models will be introduced in Part 1. 
The first risk model is mean-variance (EV) portfolio choice formulation under objective 
coefficient risk modeling analysis, and the second model is the unified model (McCarl 
and Spreen 1997). Results of these two risk modeling analyses will be presented in Part 
2. Part 3 will include a comprehensive discussion based on results of risk modeling 
analysis. All findings will be summarized in the last Part of this Section, and concluding 
remarks will be presented.  
4.1. E-V Model 
When there is a portfolio choice problem, decision makers have to set a criterion to 
develop an optimal strategy to reach their goal. The Linear Programming (LP) 
formulation was criticized by Markowitz for the drawback of investing all funds in the 
highest return option. An expected value variance (E-V) model, first formulated and 
exploited by Markowitz (1959), takes divergence between observed and modeled 
behaviors into consideration (McCarl and Spreen 1997).  
Usually, this modeling approach applies to investment in order to make the high 
returns less a risk adjustment. In this study, we introduce this risk modeling concept and 
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apply it to the mitigation strategy choice decision to reach an ideal goal of reducing the 
mean and risk aspects of welfare loss from a potential FMD outbreak in the Texas High 
Plains. A state of nature (k) refers to each of the 100 simulated welfare runs performing 
under a chosen scenario with four types of disease introduction index herd. The welfare 
levels in the 16 designed strategy combinations are treated as the objective value of Xk. 
4.1.1. E-V Model Formulation 
The following formulations are referred to McCarl and Spreen (1997): 
A general formulation of the E-V problem is 
0
..



X
bAXts
SXXXCMax
       
(28) 
In this study, the formula above defines the mean and variance of a LP objective 
function with a risky parameter, which also represents the welfare level in this case. The 
objective function maximizes expected welfare ( X) less a "risk aversion coefficient" ( ) 
times the variance of total welfare (X'SX). C represents the welfare level, and X is the 
proportion of choice when facing either using a specific mitigation strategy or not using 
it at all. In our case, we are looking for a portfolio of mitigation strategies subject to a 
proportion constraint in pursuit of expected welfare maximization. Therefore, b is equal 
to 1. The model assumes that decision makers will trade expected welfare for reduced 
variance. The GAMS formulation of E-V model is shown in Figure 16. 
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Figure 16: GAMS formulation sample – E-V Model 
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Properties of optimal E-V solution can be calculated by the Kuhn-Tucker condition. 
The Lagrangian function is  
   bAXSXXXCX  ,   (29) 
And the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are  
   
 
   
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02/

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





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X
XASXCXX
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



,
 
where μ is the vector of dual variables (Lagrangian multipliers) associated with the 
primal constraint         . 
Two major indications come from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions. First, the solution 
allows more variables to be nonzero than a LP basic solution. This occurs since variables 
can be nonzero to satisfy the n potential conditions ∂ // ∂X = 0 and the m conditions, 
where AX = b or μ = 0. Thus, the solution can have more nonzero variables than 
constraints. Second, the ∂ / ∂X equation relates resource cost (μ) with marginal revenue 
(  ) and a marginal cost of bearing risk (-2ΦX'S). The optimal shadow prices are risk 
adjusted as are the optimal decision variable values (McCarl and Spreen 1997). 
4.1.2. Unified Modeling and Stochastic Programming 
A unified model formulation is illustrated as follows:  
Max                –            
       
      
                                     
S.t.                                                                                                                               
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 ,   
                      
                                                                                                            
 
 A new variable (welfare) is introduced as the welfare level under the state of nature 
k, which is reflecting the simulated welfare level with the addition of welfare gain or 
welfare loss after a hypothetical FMD outbreak. A variable is entered for average welfare 
(       ) which is equated to the probabilities (     times the welfare levels. We treat 
all the simulation points with the same probability. All    values are equally weighted. 
This term also reflects the expected welfare maximization. Deviations between the 
average and state of nature dependent welfare level are treated in the constraint 
formulation as dk
+
 is welfare above the average level and dk
-
 shows welfare below the 
average level. The objective function includes the expected welfare value, the 
probabilities, and deviation variables. Figure 17 shows the GAMS formulation. 
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Figure 17: GAMS formulation sample – unified model 
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4.1.3. Theoretical Concerns of EV Model Use  
From the 1970s, the Expected Utility Theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern) 
gives the main theoretical basis for choice under uncertainty. The major concentration in 
the EU model is mainly on how a change in the random parameter, x, affects the 
decision made by an economic agent (Rothechild and Stiglitz 1971). McCarl and Spreen 
(1997) argue that there is a general agreement that maximizing the E-V problem is 
equivalent to maximizing expected utility when one of two conditions holds. First, the 
underlying income distribution is normal - which requires a normal distribution of the cj, 
and the utility function is exponential (Freund 1956). Second, the underlying 
distributions satisfy Meyer's location and scale restrictions. In addition, Tsiang (1972) 
has shown that E-V analysis provides an acceptable approximation of the expected 
utility choices when the risk taken is small relative to total initial wealth.  
4.2. Results 
In this section, a sorted ASM welfare data set from the previous section is used, and 
welfare changes are transferred to the total welfare values for each party and a U.S. total 
as the variable for each state of nature after the addition of the base welfare value. The 
base welfare level is the welfare level before the outbreak is initiated. The welfare value 
becomes the c in the objective function of the EV model. There are four types of disease 
introduction index herds for each of the 16 strategy combinations. In each combination 
for each index herd, there are 100 ASM simulation runs that are treated as states of 
nature. 
In this analysis, mitigation strategies are the variables of interest as selected in both 
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original and alternative designs for the EV modeling and Unified modeling portfolio 
analysis. This risk modeling methodology is used to test the effectiveness of each focus 
mitigation strategy in the aspect of U.S. consumers‟ surplus, U.S. processors‟ surplus, 
U.S. producers‟ surplus, and total U.S. welfare. A switch point of RAP can help us to 
realize the response of decision makers to a selected mitigation strategy at certain levels 
of risk aversion. Moreover, those two portfolio models can provide us suggestions in 
possible investment on either a single mitigation strategy or a mixed set of strategies.  
However, since we can only pick one as a preferred option, the choice with more 
investment share units will be viewed as a preferred strategy in the situation when there 
exists an optimal portfolio selection for both using the targeted mitigation strategy and 
the opposite mitigation strategy.  
4.2.1. Overall Results for All Strategies with Respect to U.S. Total Welfare 
First, we check the U.S. total welfare levels from all 64 scenarios after the addition 
of welfare changes assuming an FMD outbreak occurring in the Texas High Plains. We 
treat the four types of disease introduction index herds as events in our formulations, and 
the 16 different strategy combinations as variables (see Table 13). For each type of 
introduction index herd, there are 100 simulated welfare change runs in each strategy 
combination. With the addition of base welfare level, those 6,400 runs are viewed as 
states of nature given a potential FMD outbreak. 
The EV portfolio modeling runs with varying Risk Aversion Parameter (RAP), 
which is presented in Figure 18, show us that there is only one solution (use4) 
dominating all the other strategy combination designs in the RAP range between 0 and 
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0.002 with respect to the U.S. total welfare. The use4 strategy that includes ring 
slaughter, regular surveillance, slaughters of infecteds, slaugher of dc‟s, late detection, 
targeted vaccination, and inadequate vaccines. As the RAP rises to between 0.002 and 
0.003, other strategies (use9, use14, use16) are being introduced into the optimal mixed 
portfolio result. The use4 strategy still has the laregest proportion in the mixed results 
and remains a preferred strategy as the RAP is equal to or less than 0.025.  
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Table 13: Use of Mitigation Strategy Combination in GAMS Formulation 
 
           
 
 
  
Mitigation Strategy (M) USE 
Ring slaughter, regular surveillance, slaughter of infecteds, slaughter of dc's, early 
detection 
1 
Ring slaughter, regular surveillance, slaughter of infecteds, slaughter of dc's, late 
detection 
2 
Ring slaughter, regular surveillance, slaughter of infecteds, slaughter of dc's, late 
detection, targeted vaccination, adequate vaccine 
3 
Ring slaughter, regular surveillance, slaughter of infecteds, slaughter of dc's, late 
detection, targeted vaccination, inadequate vaccine 
4 
Enhanced surveillance, slaughter of infecteds, slaughter of dc's, early detection 5 
Enhanced surveillance, slaughter of infecteds, slaughter of dc's, late detection 6 
Enhanced surveillance, slaughter of infecteds, slaughter of dc's, late detection, 
targeted vaccination, adequate vaccine 
7 
Enhanced surveillance, slaughter of infecteds, slaughter of dc's, late detection, 
targeted vaccination, inadequate vaccine 
8 
Slaughter of infecteds, slaughter of dc's, regular surveillance, ring vaccination, early 
detection, inadequate vaccine 
9 
Slaughter of infecteds, slaughter of dc's, regular surveillance, early detection 10 
Slaughter of infecteds, slaughter of dc's, regular surveillance, late detection, ring 
vaccination, adequate vaccine 
11 
Slaughter of infecteds, slaughter of dc's, regular surveillance, late detection, ring 
vaccination, inadequate vaccine 
12 
Slaughter of infecteds, slaughter of dc's, regular surveillance, early detection, 
targeted vaccination, adequate vaccine 
13 
Slaughter of infecteds, slaughter of dc's, regular surveillance, late detection 14 
Slaughter of infecteds, slaughter of dc's, regular surveillance, late detection, targeted 
vaccination, adequate vaccine 
15 
Slaughter of infecteds, slaughter of dc's, regular surveillance, early detection, ring 
vaccination, adequate vaccine 
16 
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Figure 18: Results from E-V model runs with varying RAPs for all strategies with 
respect to U.S. total welfare 
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The preferred strategy switches from the use4 strategy to the use16 strategy as the 
RAP rises to between 0.025 and 0.05. The use16 strategy includes slaughter of infecteds, 
slaughter of dc's, regular surveillance, early detection, ring vaccination, and adequate 
vaccination. As the RAP rises to 0.05 and higher, most of the 16 strategy combinations 
are selected in the optimal portfolio results. In the RAP range between 0.05 and 80, the 
maximum in our EV modeling outputs, the strategies with a significant portfolio 
proportion result that is higher than 0.1 are use4, use11, use13, and use16. The use11 
strategy is the combination of slaughter of infected slaughter of dc's, regular surveillance, 
late detection, ring vaccination, and adequate vaccine. The use13 strategy includes 
slaughter of infecteds, slaughter of dc's, regular surveillance, early detection, targeted 
vaccination, and adequate vaccine. We find that adequate vaccination has great 
advantages, because it is part of the use4, use11, use13, and use16 strategy combinations.   
The overall portfolio result indicates that if decision makers are more risk averse if 
the RAC is greater than 0.05, then they might consider mitigation strategies that employ 
early detection and adequate vaccination. As risk aversion rises to a even higher level, 
the three mitigation strategies might offer certain helps to maximize the obejective 
function in the EV modeling with the various strategy combinations in the optimal 
portflio outcome. However, McCarl and Bessler (1989) suggest that RAC should fall 
within the reasonable bounds, and using an unreasonably large maximum RAC value is 
always seen in the literatures. In addition, how to identify the preferred strategy becomes 
difficult as RAP rises among most of the 16 mixed strategy usages in the output table.    
From the results shown in the previous section, we have known that there are 
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siginificant welfare distributions among U.S. consumers, U.S. processors, and U.S. 
producers. U.S. producers suffer a possible welfare loss when there is a FMD outbreak 
occurring in the Texas High Plains. Therefore, further investigation with a specific 
design for treating mitigation strategies as the variable of interests researching the effects 
on the welfare of different parties should be conducted, which is designed to prevent a 
huge loss in the welfare of any specific party in the nation. 
      Based on the optimal portfolio result of Unified model runs in Figure 19, we 
have found that the strategy combination (use14) is the only selected strategy within the 
RAP range between 0 and 0.5. The use14 strategy includes slaughter of infecteds, 
slaughter of dc's, regular surveillance, and late detection. This strategy is very similar to 
the use4 strategy combination in the previous EV model runs. An optimal solution of a  
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Figure 19: Results from unified model runs with varying RAPs for all strategies with 
respect to U.S. total welfare 
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mixed strategy (use14 and use16) begins when the RAC is between 0.5 and 1. As the 
risk aversion level rises above 2.5, more strategy combinations are selected in the 
optimal mixed strategy portfolio. Meanwhile, the use14 strategy is the preferred strategy 
due to its largest proportion in the portfolio. The preferred strategy usage is switched 
from use14 strategy to use16 strategy when the RAC rises to between 5 and 10. The 
use16 strategy begins to serve as a preferred strategy to improve the overall welfare 
objective function in the face of a hypothetical FMD outbreak when RAP is equal to or 
higher than 10. The difference between use14 and use16 is that three more mitigation 
strategies, including early detection, ring vaccination, and adequate vaccine, are included 
in the use16 strategy combination. Two of them are our targeted strategies in this study.  
Moreover, in the RAP range between 10 and 80, which is the maximum in our 
modeling, the strategies with a significant proportion in the optimal portfolio result that 
is higher than 0.1 are use2, use11, use13, use14, and use16. The use2 strategy combines 
with strategies of ring slaughter, regular surveillance, slaughter of infecteds, slaughter of 
dc's, and late detection; the use11 strategy is the combination of slaughter of infecteds, 
slaughter of dc's, regular surveillance, late detection, ring vaccination, and adequate 
vaccine; the use13 strategy includes slaughter of infecteds, slaughter of dc's, regular 
surveillance, early detection, targeted vaccination, and adequate vaccine. We are not able 
to prove any advantage of any targeted mitigation strategy by looking for similarities 
among those strategy combinations with a significant proportion under the given result.  
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From this overall effect evaluation for all strategies in the Unified modeling, we can 
conclude that early detection and adequate vaccination could both be good mitigation 
strategies as the decision makers become risk averse.  
The contribution of the three targeted mitigation strategies to maximize the 
established objective function in both the EV model and the Unified model cannot be 
identified to provide strong enough evidence for the effectiveness of the overall effects 
on the U.S. total welfare. More efforts can be made with further investigation on the 
effects based on the design for the variables of interest for each mitigation strategy in the 
welfare comparisons of each different party and U.S. total welfare.    
4.2.2. Results for Early Detection as a Mitigation Strategy 
In this section, we continue to use the alternative design where mitigation strategies 
are treated as the variable of interest with a specific objective to avoid inter-strategy 
effects. The optimal portfolio results of both EV modeling and Unified modeling runs 
are shown in Table 14. The major findings are summarized as follows.  
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Table 14: Optimal Proportion Usage for Early Detection as a Mitigation Strategy 
 
RAP EV Model  Unified Model 
  PS PR CS Total PS PR CS Total 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
0.0003 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
0.0005 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
0.0008 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
0.001 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
0.0015 0 0 0.976 0 0 0 1 0 
0.002 0.079 0 0.876 0 0 0 1 0 
0.003 0.247 0 0.775 0 0 0 1 0 
0.005 0.381 0.003 0.695 0 0 0 1 0 
0.01 0.482 0.269 0.634 0 0 0 1 0 
0.011 0.491 0.293 0.629 0.037 0 0 1 0 
0.013 0.502 0.322 0.622 0.094 0 0 1 0 
0.015 0.515 0.358 0.614 0.164 0 0 1 0 
0.025 0.542 0.429 0.598 0.305 0 0 1 0 
0.05 0.562 0.482 0.586 0.411 0 0 1 0 
0.1 0.572 0.509 0.58 0.463 0 0 1 0 
0.3 0.579 0.526 0.576 0.499 0 0 1 0 
0.5 0.58 0.53 0.575 0.506 0 0 1 0 
1 0.581 0.533 0.574 0.511 0 0 1 0 
2.5 0.582 0.534 0.574 0.514 0 0 1 0 
5 0.582 0.535 0.574 0.515 0.164 0 0.773 0 
10 0.582 0.535 0.574 0.516 0.412 0 0.667 0.284 
15 0.582 0.535 0.574 0.516 0.472 0 0.635 0.368 
20 0.582 0.535 0.574 0.516 0.5 0 0.62 0.407 
40 0.488 0.374 0.574 0.516 0.542 0 0.597 0.462 
80 0.244 0.187 0.574 0.516 0.562 0 0.585 0.489 
 
*Note: PS -U.S. Producers, PR - U.S. Processors, CS - U.S. Consumers; the highlighted slots indicate 
early detection is a dominant or preferred strategy. 
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For U.S. consumers: 
 Results indicate that early detection is a good option for disease control for risk 
neutral (RAP=0) to risk averse (RAP>0) decision making in both models. EV 
modeling results show that early detection is a dominant strategy as the RAP is 
between 0 and 0.001, while Unified modeling suggests that early detection is the 
only selected strategy for usage as the RAP is between 0 and 2.5. The optimal 
proportion outcome suggests a mixed strategy that includes both early detection and 
late detection starting when the RAP is equal to or greater than 0.0015 in the EV 
modeling case and 5 in the Unified modeling case, respectively. However, early 
detection has greater proportion and remains a preferred strategy in both modeling 
cases.  
For U.S. processors:  
 Early detection strategy is not a better choice for U.S. processors in the EV 
modeling runs as the RAP is between 0 and 0.05. However, early detection becomes 
a preferred strategy as its optimal proportion is greater than the proportion of the 
late detection strategy when the RAP is 0.1 or higher. However, early detection does 
not offer a better option for U.S. processors in the Unified modeling result. 
For U.S. producers: 
 Early detection strategy can be a good choice in both modeling runs. However, the 
switch RAP points in both modeling outcomes are very different. In the EV 
modeling case, early detection becomes a preferred strategy as RAP is equal to or 
greater than 0.013; in the Unified modeling case, the preference is the late detection 
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strategy instead. The preference switches from late detection to a mixed strategy 
only when RAP is equal to or greater than 5. Early detection has the same or greater 
proportion in the optimal portfolio selection and becomes a preferred strategy as 
RAC rises up to 20 or higher.  
For overall U.S. welfare: 
 Early detection can be a preferred option to choose. EV modeling outcome 
indicates that its optimal proportion is equal to or greater than the proportion of the 
late detection strategy as the RAP is equal to or greater than 0.5. However, in the 
Unified modeling result, early detection can never become a preferred strategy even 
though the RAC reaches to a very high level. 
4.2.3. Results for Adequate Vaccination as a Mitigation Strategy  
The results are shown in Table 15. Major findings in both EV modeling and Unified 
modeling results are summarized as follows. 
For U.S. consumers: 
 Adequate vaccination provides a good option for disease control for risk neutral 
(RAP=0) to risk averse (RAP>0) decision making for U.S. consumers in both 
models. EV modeling results show adequate vaccination is a dominant strategy as 
the RAP is between 0 and 0.0003, while Unified modeling suggests that adequate 
vaccination is the only selected strategy for usage as the RAP is between 0 and 
0.015. The optimal proportion outcome suggests a mixed strategy that includes both 
adequate vaccination and inadequate vaccination starting when the RAP is equal to 
or greater than 0.0003 in the EV modeling case and 0.025 in the Unified modeling 
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case, respectively. However, adequate vaccination has greater proportion and 
remains a preferred strategy in both modeling cases.  
 
Table 15: Optimal Proportion Usage for Adequate Vaccine 
 
RAP 
  
EV Model Unified Model 
PS PR CS Total PS PR CS Total  
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
0.0003 0 0 0.533 0 0 0 1 0 
0.0005 0 0 0.525 0 0 0 1 0 
0.0008 0.105 0 0.522 0 0 0 1 0 
0.001 0.213 0 0.521 0 0 0 1 0 
0.0015 0.32 0 0.519 0 0 0 1 0 
0.002 0.373 0 0.519 0 0 0 1 0 
0.003 0.427 0 0.518 0 0 0 1 0 
0.005 0.47 0.073 0.518 0 0 0 1 0 
0.01 0.502 0.263 0.517 0.037 0 0 1 0 
0.011 0.505 0.28 0.517 0.079 0 0 1 0 
0.013 0.509 0.301 0.517 0.13 0 0 1 0 
0.015 0.513 0.326 0.517 0.191 0 0 1 0 
0.025 0.521 0.376 0.517 0.315 0 0 0.823 0 
0.05 0.528 0.414 0.517 0.407 0 0 0.649 0 
0.1 0.531 0.433 0.517 0.453 0 0 0.581 0 
0.3 0.533 0.446 0.517 0.484 0 0 0.538 0 
0.5 0.534 0.449 0.517 0.49 0 0 0.53 0 
1 0.534 0.45 0.517 0.495 0 0 0.523 0 
2.5 0.534 0.452 0.517 0.498 0.297 0 0.519 0 
5 0.534 0.452 0.517 0.499 0.425 0.284 0.518 0 
10 0.534 0.452 0.517 0.499 0.48 0.373 0.517 0.293 
15 0.534 0.452 0.517 0.499 0.499 0.4 0.517 0.367 
20 0.534 0.452 0.517 0.499 0.508 0.413 0.517 0.401 
40 0.417 0.289 0.517 0.499 0.521 0.433 0.517 0.451 
80 0.209 0.144 0.517 0.5 0.528 0.433 0.517 0.475 
 
*Note: PS -U.S. Producers, PR - U.S. Processors, CS - U.S. Consumers; the highlighted slots indicate 
adequate vaccination is a dominant or preferred strategy. 
 
   
106 
For U.S. processors: 
 The adequate vaccination strategy does not offer a better choice for U.S. processors 
in both modeling results. Adequate vaccination has a proportion in an optimal 
mixed strategy solution as the RAP is equal to or greater than 0.005 in the EV 
modeling results. In the Unified modeling results, a mixed strategy happens only 
when the RAP is equal to or greater than 5. The proportion of the adequate 
vaccination strategy is always smaller than the proportion of inadequate vaccination 
in both modeling results. Therefore, the adequate vaccination strategy is not in the 
preference for U.S. processors. 
For U.S. producers:  
 The adequate vaccination strategy can be a good choice for U.S. producers in both 
modeling runs. However, the switch RAP points in both modeling outcomes are 
very different. In the EV modeling case, adequate vaccination becomes a preferred 
strategy as RAP is equal to or greater than 0.01; however, in the Unified modeling 
case, adequate vaccination is preferred only when there is a decision maker whose 
RAP level is equal to or greater than 20.  
For overall U.S. welfare: 
 Adequate vaccination becomes a preferred strategy in the EV modeling results only 
when the RAP is equal to or greater than 80, while it has a share of optimal usage as 
the RAP is equal to or greater than 0.005. In the Unified modeling results, adequate 
vaccination has the proportion of optimal usage as the RAC is equal to or greater 
than 5, and it never becomes a preferred strategy. 
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4.2.4. Results for Enhanced Surveillance as a Mitigation Strategy 
The results for the enhanced surveillance as a mitigation strategy are shown in 
Table 16. Major findings in both EV modeling and Unified modeling results are 
summarized as follows. 
For U.S. consumers: 
 The enhanced surveillance strategy is a good option for U.S. consumers to invest 
within the range from risk neutral (RAC=0) to risk averse (RAC>0) in both 
modeling results. Enhanced strategy is the only preferred strategy when the RAP is 
between 0 and 0.0003 in the EV modeling results and the RAP is between 0 and 0.5 
in the Unified modeling. Even though a mixed strategy solution exists at a higher 
RAP level, enhanced surveillance still gives a better outcome for U.S. consumers. 
For U.S. processors: 
 The enhanced surveillance strategy does not offer a better choice for U.S. 
processors in both the EV modeling and Unified modeling results. Enhanced 
surveillance has a proportion in an optimal mixed strategy solution as the RAP is 
equal to or greater than 0.005 in the EV modeling results. In the Unified modeling 
results, a mixed strategy exists only when the RAP is equal to or greater than 2.5. 
The proportion of enhanced surveillance strategy is always smaller than the 
proportion of regular surveillance in both modeling results. Generally, U.S. 
processors do not prefer this enhanced surveillance strategy in both of the modeling 
results. 
For U.S. producers: 
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 Enhanced surveillance is a preferred option when the RAP is equal to or greater 
than 0.015 in the EV modeling results. In the Unified modeling, the preference 
switches from regular surveillance to enhanced surveillance when the RAP is equal 
to or greater than 20. 
For overall U.S. welfare: 
 Enhanced surveillance becomes a preferred strategy as its usage proportion in the 
optimal solution is equal to or greater than the proportion of regular surveillance in 
the EV modeling results as the RAP is equal to or greater than 5. In the Unified 
modeling results, enhanced surveillance does not become a preferred strategy 
because regular surveillance always has a greater usage proportion in all RAP 
ranges between 0 and 80. 
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Table 16: Optimal Proportion Usage for Enhanced Surveillance 
 
RAP 
EV Model Unified Model  
  PS PR CS Total PS PR CS Total  
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
0.0003 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
0.0005 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
0.0008 0 0 0.847 0 0 0 1 0 
0.001 0 0 0.767 0 0 0 1 0 
0.0015 0.158 0 0.687 0 0 0 1 0 
0.002 0.254 0 0.647 0 0 0 1 0 
0.003 0.35 0 0.607 0 0 0 1 0 
0.005 0.427 0.025 0.575 0 0 0 1 0 
0.01 0.484 0.246 0.551 0.028 0 0 1 0 
0.011 0.489 0.266 0.548 0.071 0 0 1 0 
0.013 0.496 0.29 0.546 0.122 0 0 1 0 
0.015 0.503 0.319 0.543 0.186 0 0 1 0 
0.025 0.519 0.378 0.536 0.312 0 0 1 0 
0.05 0.53 0.422 0.531 0.406 0 0 1 0 
0.1 0.536 0.444 0.529 0.454 0 0 1 0 
0.3 0.54 0.459 0.527 0.485 0 0 1 0 
0.5 0.541 0.462 0.527 0.492 0 0 1 0 
1 0.541 0.464 0.527 0.496 0 0 0.883 0 
2.5 0.541 0.465 0.527 0.499 0.206 0.069 0.646 0 
5 0.542 0.466 0.527 0.5 0.396 0.299 0.585 0.178 
10 0.542 0.466 0.527 0.501 0.471 0.386 0.556 0.355 
15 0.542 0.466 0.527 0.501 0.495 0.413 0.546 0.405 
20 0.542 0.381 0.527 0.501 0.506 0.426 0.541 0.43 
40 0.393 0.191 0.527 0.501 0.524 0.446 0.534 0.466 
80 0.196 0.095 0.527 0.501 0.533 0.456 0.53 0.483 
 
*Note: PS -U.S. Producers, PR - U.S. Processors, CS - U.S. Consumers; the highlighted slots indicate 
enhanced surveillance is a dominant or preferred strategy. 
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4.3. Summary 
Through the two risk portfolio models, we find that preference for control strategies 
depends on risk attitude. For total U.S. welfare, adequate vaccination gains a greater 
share as with larger RAPs. In the Unified modeling, early detection and adequate 
vaccination increase as the RAP reaches a high level. However, additional information 
arises when other parties are considered. 
Early detection proves to be preferable for U.S. consumers. The EV optimal 
portfolio solutions show that early detection brings benefits for U.S. processors and U.S. 
producers as RAP rises. However, in the Unified modeling result this takes a high RAP.  
In the adequate vaccination strategy analysis shows that it benefits U.S. consumers, 
but does not give U.S. processors a better outcome. Adequate vaccination provides a 
better choice for U.S. producers as the RAP rises in the EV modeling solution, but it is 
only preferred with a high RAP in the Unified modeling framework.  
Enhanced surveillance is preferred for U.S. consumers. For U.S. processors, 
enhanced surveillance does not give a better risk/return outcome. U.S. producers switch 
their preference from regular surveillance to enhanced surveillance as their RAP rises.  
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5. CONCLUSIONS, FUTURE RESEARCH,  AND LIMITATIONS 
5.1. Summary of Major Findings  
In this dissertation, I examined the desirability of using three major mitigation 
strategies under a simulated FMD outbreak originating in the Texas High Plains. This 
was done using conventional cost benefit, welfare analysis and risk analysis. The welfare 
results come from an epidemic- economic analysis utilizing an agricultural sector model 
(ASM) operating over the results of the epidemiologic model (AusSpread). The analysis 
yields project the impact of possible outbreaks on animal slaughter, U.S. consumers‟ 
welfare, U.S. processors‟ welfare, U.S. producers‟ welfare, and overall U.S. welfare.  
The main findings from this work are:  
 Current literature suggests that early detection may be the most economically 
acceptable mitigation strategy. In this study, we have found that it is not preferable 
under risk neutrality, but becomes preferable as the decision maker becomes more 
risk averse (e.g., with a higher RAP).  
 Current literature suggests that the adequate vaccine availability strategy may not 
be very cost effective. We also find that this vaccine availability strategy is never 
economic under expected value maximization but can become so under risk 
aversion. U.S. consumers are the main welfare beneficiary from the usage of this 
strategy, but U.S. producers suffer a large average welfare loss. The risk portfolio 
modeling shows that adequate vaccination reduces risk for U.S. consumers, but not 
for U.S. processors. For U.S. producers and overall U.S. welfare, adequate 
vaccination becomes preferred as the RAP rises.  
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 Enhanced surveillance measures are generally not preferred in the stochastic 
dominance comparison, but are preferred in the risk portfolio model as the RAP 
rises. The risk modeling results indicate that enhanced surveillance could help both 
U.S. consumers and producers in risk management. 
 We find that U.S. consumers are the major beneficiary group from any of the three 
mitigation strategies, while U.S. producers outside the study area generally suffer a 
greater loss. A comprehensive compensation scheme might need to be developed to 
overcome those distributional differences with the corresponded welfare change 
estimates in this study.  
 Risk is found to be an important factor indecision making. A number of mitigation 
strategies become more acceptable when risk management is considered.  
 The results we have found above show implications for policy makers. It is 
important to examine vulnerability and possible mitigation strategies for a number 
of disease vulnerabilities. From an economic welfare analysis, the results from such 
evaluations can identify both absolute and distributional welfare results across 
different parties in the society. A compensation program could be established on the 
basis of that welfare evaluation in order to improve biosecurity strategy 
performance. 
5.2. Limitations 
Limitations of this study are associated with the treatment of correlation, case study 
specificity, and reliance on one epidemic model with limited cases.  
 Identification of the desirability of possible strategies can be complicated by the 
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experimental design used in the epidemic model simulations. The alternative design 
for the three mitigation strategies improved my ability to identify the effects and 
further efforts along that line may well be in order. 
 Case study specificity is another limitation because the effort is concentrated in the 
Texas High Plains, but other regions may respond differently, and thus the results 
are not generalizable. 
 Reliance on one epidemic model might also restrict the generalization of the 
findings in this study.  
5.3. Future Research 
More future research can be done in several ways:  
 A two-stage stochastic programming with recourse study could be done to examine 
the decisions made stage by stage with alternative strategies pursued as the 
outbreak proceeds and consideration of any a priori costs that may be encountered,. 
In the first stage, the cattle production and fixed cost investment would be 
determined before an FMD outbreak. Then cattle production, disease management 
effort, production and market prices depend on whether a FMD outbreak occurs or 
not, and are reflected in the second stage.  
 A case study on the UK outbreak could be conducted to investigate th risk attitudes 
for decision makers. 
 A trade analysis with the framework of the two-stage stochastic programming could 
be further accomplished to examine the implications of meat trading bans.  
 The study suffers from limitations in the use of a single epidemic model, a limited 
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set of mitigation strategies, and case study region specificity. The work could be 
extended to use more models over a wider geographic area with more strategies 
evaluated. 
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